Features

Rupert Butler returned to the Bar in 2003, after a three year hiatus from practice. A barrister since 1988,  he specialises in various areas of law, including commercial, sports, and media. He spent two years working in a solicitors’ firm and it was here that he honed his litigation skills. At the time, he says, “I was always frustrated and held back by the limits on barristers [who wanted to undertake litigation]. It meant you could offer a service, but not a complete service...”  

That all changed in January 2014. The new Handbook was introduced by the Bar Standards Board (BSB). Previous rules preventing self-employed barristers from applying for authorisation to conduct litigation were removed. Butler is enthusiastic about the change – confident that it will help him adapt the way he delivers services to meet the needs of his clients. “I’m now a genuine one-stop-shop. I will now be able to handle [clients’] needs without the intervention of a solicitor.” 

Elspeth Talbot Rice QC and Andrew Holden ask who is a “trustee” for limitation purposes?  

Section 21(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 provides for there to be no period of limitation for claims by benefi ciaries under a trust in respect of a fraudulent breach of trust to which the trustee was party or privy, or to recover trust property in his hands. But who is a trustee for this purpose? In Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, the Supreme Court decided that third party accessories to a breach of trust are not. In this article, we explore who is. In particular, we look at company directors, liquidators, and trustees in bankruptcy. 

Stephen Moverley Smith QC and Harry Sharpe ask when does coercion of a group to accept a proposal constitute oppression of the minority?  

This article compares the decisions in Assénagon v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation  and Azevedo v Imcopa Importacao  and asks what conclusions can be drawn about the application of minority oppression principles from the divergent treatment of two similar restructuring techniques. 

Chris Bath asks whether we need to look again at legal privilege and appropriate adults.  

Appropriate adults should be enabled to be present in police station legal consultations, without risk of detriment to the client. This was my conclusion after shadowing an appropriate adult (AA) during a PACE interview that might fairly be described as a slow motion car crash.  

Sleepwalking away from fair trials, John Cooper QC writes.  

In many respects we have been sleepwalking into a complete realignment of the fundamental principles of our criminal justice system and it is not that the process has been recent. 

Henry Morton Jack discusses fatal accidents abroad.  

The Supreme Court recently handed down judgment in  Cox v Ergo Versicherung AG (formerly known as Victoria)  [2014] UKSC 22, [2014] All ER (D) 16 (Apr) on a number of preliminary issues. The judgment concerns the law applicable to the assessment of damages suffered by dependants of a person killed in an accident abroad. 

Richard Adkinson welcomes judicial guidance on the thorny issue of the quantum of damages for breach of contract.  

In  Fulton Shipping Inc of Panama v Globalia Business Travel SAU  [2014] EWHC 1547 (Comm), [2014] All ER (D) 184 (May) the claimant, Fulton Shipping (the owner) managed a small cruise ship called the “New Flamenco”. It had chartered it to the defendant, Globalia Business (the charterer). In August 2005, the parties agreed to extend the charter to 28 October 2007 with an option for a third year. On 8 June 2007, it agreed to extend the charter to 2 November 2009. 

Taryn Lee QC on a fresh approach to social mobility.  

Social mobility sparks all sorts of debate across the Bar. Is it easier to join the Bar if you have a less or more traditional background today? Are parental or familial links still as important as they once were? Should we be encouraging young people to consider a career at the Bar when we know how hard it is to start out in the current climate? 

For the past twenty-five years, I have made my living as a trial lawyer, plying my trade in courtrooms throughout Texas (and elsewhere), defending individuals and businesses in civil litigation. But the trials have become fewer and farther between in recent years; in Dallas, where I am based, only 1,195 district court jury trials were held in 2011—just one-third the number that occurred in 1996. And it’s not because people have become less litigious, either. During the same time period, the number of lawsuits filed rose 25%. Throughout Texas, from 1986 to 2008, civil jury trials in state courts fell by 60%. For the fiscal year 2012 alone, only 0.4% of civil cases were resolved by a jury or directed verdict in Texas courts.  

This is not a problem unique to Texas, but instead is a national phenomenon. Most states report similarly precipitous declines in jury trials, and in 2010, only 2,156 civil jury trials were commenced in federal district courts—meaning that, on average, U.S. district court judges tried fewer than four civil jury trials each that year. 

Both the Law Society and the Bar Council have put their weight behind the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Opinion in the profession has also largely been in favour of the Act. At the end of 2012, 96% of those that responded to a poll called for the Act’s retention. Against this background, it is perplexing to learn that there are discussions about repealing the Act. The effects of this move would have constitutional significance and so it is important for all who operate within the HRA framework, including the legal profession, to keep in mind the benefits and history of the Act.  

Since the Act entered into force, the HRA has allowed individuals to enforce directly their rights in all courts and it requires public bodies to respect those rights. The HRA also contains a set of common standards which binds the devolved jurisdictions of the UK together within the Union.