Latest Cases

Conflict of laws – Jurisdiction. The claimant brought proceedings against the defendant in England, claiming a sum said to be due in respect of the supply of bunkers for vessels. The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of the English court, contending that prior proceedings in Cyprus, concerning a guarantee between the parties, would determine the issues before the English court. The Commercial Court, in dismissing the defendant's challenge to jurisdiction, held that the English the Cypriot proceedings had neither the same cause, nor the same object. 

Vicarious liability – Crown. The claimant prison catering manager was injured by the negligence of a prisoner. She issued proceedings against the defendant Ministry of Justice (MoJ) for damages for personal injury. The judge dismissed her claims and the claimant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division held that the MoJ was vicariously liable for the injury caused to the claimant, as the differences from the normal employment relationship between the prisoner and the MoJ rendered the relationship between them, if anything, closer than that of an employer and its employees. 

Claim form – Service. The proceedings concerned a dispute arising from an accident in the transportation of a wind turbine by the claimant haulage company, Mar-Train. The first defendant company, F&T, applied to set aside service of the claim form and for a declaration that the English court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. The issue arose as to whether there was a good arguable case that ALS had acted as F&T's agent when it contracted with Mar-Train. The Commercial Court held that, on the evidence, Mar-Train had an arguable case, and hence the application would be dismissed. 

Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. The claimants sought the continuation of a freezing order that had been made against the defendants to freeze money that could potentially have been used to cover the claimants' costs. The claimants made an application, seeking to have the freezing order extended. The Chancery Division held that the order would not be continued, as the court had never had jurisdiction to make a freezing order to secure the rights which the claimants might in due course acquire pursuant to an order for costs. Consequently, the order would not be continued and the action dismissed. 

Trade mark – Registration. The Chancery Division considered a dispute regarding trade marks concerned with the martial art Shorinji Kempo. It held that, on the evidence, that the claimant's appeal against the registering of the defendant's trade mark would be dismissed on the grounds that, among other things, the defendant's mark was not similar to an earlier mark owned by the claimant. 

Building contract – Adjudication. The defendant construction company employed the claimant under a number of separate orders to undertake tendered works for the refurbishment of properties. The claimant contended that all of the sub-contract works were ordered under one overarching order. However, the defendant contended that the main order had never been accepted by the claimant and that the all works had been undertaken under separate contracts. An adjudicator, having found that he had jurisdiction, made an award in favour of the claimant. The claimant sought to enforce the award. The Technology and Construction Court, in dismissing the claim, held that, on the facts, the adjudicator had had no jurisdiction to decide the disputes arising under the separate contracts, each with different terms and subject matter. It followed that the claimant was unable to enforce the adjudicator's award in its favour. 

Sentence – Mandatory life sentence. The first defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 40 years and the second defendant had been sentenced to life imprisonment with a whole life order. The instant proceedings challenged the statutory scheme enacted for sentencing an adult guilty of murder as incompatible with art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that the statutory regime was compatible with art 3 of the Convention, as it provided to an offender 'hope' or the 'possibility' of release in exceptional circumstances which rendered the just punishment originally imposed no longer justifiable. In the defendants' circumstances, whole life orders were appropriate. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. Allowing the claimant's claim for judicial review, the Administrative Court held that the claimant had received a letter from the defendant Secretary of State promising in unequivocal terms that her application would be decided by 20th July 2011. That letter had created a legitimate expectation that her application would result in a decision before the stipulated date and upon the basis of the rues as they then applied she would have been entitled to indefinite leave to remain. Accordingly, the claimant would be entitled to an order that she be granted indefinite leave to remain. 

Adoption – Application. A child born in 2008 with serious disabilities which required a high level of care was authorised for adoption with existing carers. The father applied to the court for permission to oppose the adoption pursuant to s 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. The Family Division held that recent developments in the law constituted a change in circumstances and further the father's prospects of success were not fanciful. 

Housing – Persons in need of care and attention. Philip suffered a number of disabilities and had, since a young age been in foster care pursuant to the Children Act 1989. Although he had lived with his carers in South Gloucestershire, the local authority that had had responsibility for providing his care had been Wiltshire. As Philip approached the age of 18, questions were raised as to which authority would be responsible for the provision of his care pursuant to s 21 of the National Assistance Act 1948, it having previously been determined that he should live as close as possible to his family in Cornwall. On turning 18, he moved to residential accommodation in Somerset. The Secretary of State had determined that Philip's place of ordinary residence was Cornwall. Cornwall Council had unsuccessfully sought judicial review of that decision. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the appeal, finding that the Secretary of State had applied the wrong test. On remaking the decision, the court found that South Gloucestershire had been Philip's place of ordinary residence.