Latest Cases

Medical practitioner – Professional conduct committee. The Fitness to Practise Panel (the panel) of the respondent General Medical Council found the appellant doctor guilty of misconduct, that his fitness to practise was impaired and suspended him for 12 months. The appellant appealed. The Administrative Court held that the panel had erred in finding that the appellant had dishonestly failed to inform his employers of a warning, as he had had no obligation to do so. However, the decision to suspend the appellant had not been rendered wrong by that erroneous finding. 

Trust and trustee – Constructive trust. The claimant held a charge over a property, which had been occupied by the second defendant. It sought to retain a sum of money from the net proceeds of the sale of the property. The second defendant contended that he was entitled to that sum as the beneficial owner of the property. The Chancery Division held that, whilst the second defendant had been the beneficial owner of the property, on the facts, he could not assert his beneficial ownership of the property in priority to the claimant's charge. The claimant was entitled to retain the amount it held from the proceeds of sale of the property. The second defendant was entitled to the surplus paid into court in respect of the balance of the proceeds of sale. 

Trust and trustee – Removal of trustee. A dispute arose regarding a trust deed that had been created in respect of property held by a Sikh Gurdwara. The dispute concerned the appointment and removal of trustees and whether the recognised religious head was, in fact, the successor to that role. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, had permanently stayed proceedings on the ground that the dispute raised a non-justiciable issue regarding religious doctrine and practice. The Supreme Court remitted the matter to trial at the High Court. The issues regarding the trust deed could only be determined at a full trial. Further, it was established law that the court could consider religious issues where there were civil law consequences. 

Unfair dismissal – Trade union membership and activities. The employment tribunal had dismissed the employee's application for interim relief under s 161 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. On appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the judge had erred in determining that an employment tribunal at a liability hearing would not be likely to find that the employee had been dismissed for taking part in trade union activities. He had erred in so deciding on the basis that it was not likely that the tribunal would find that the true reason for the dismissal had been the activity as opposed to the way in which it had been carried out. 

Negligence – Personal injury. There were several negligence claims consolidated in regard to certain alleged road traffic accidents. The Queen's Bench Division held that on the evidence, no road traffic accidents of the sort alleged in the claim forms had occurred and the claims would be dismissed. 

Contract – Breach. The claimant company, Voiceflex, provided services to the defendant company, Frip, under a contract. In October 2011, hackers hacked into Frip's computers and many phone calls were made by persons unknown. Voiceflex sought to invoice Frip for the calls, and brought proceedings. The Technology and Construction Court, in dismissing the claim, held that, on the evidence, Frip had not used insufficient security, and that, on the agreement between the parties, Frip had only been obliged to pay for the calls that it actually made. 

Abortion – Legal abortion. The local authority came before the court seeking an order that the pregnancy of a 13 year old girl be terminated. The Family Division held that having regard to the terms of the Abortion Act 1967 and the best interests of the girl, there would be an order for a termination. 

Value added tax – Repayment of. The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (the tribunal) allowed the appeal by the Revenue and Customs Commissioners against the refusal by the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (the FTT) to strike out the taxpayer's appeal against the Revenue's rejection of the taxpayer's direct claim from the Revenue for repayment of VAT erroneously charged on an exempt supply. The tribunal decided that the FTT had no jurisdiction to entertain that appeal on the basis that pursuant to s 80 of the Value Added Tax Act 1994, a claim for repayment might only be made by the person who had accounted for and paid to the Revenue the tax then being reclaimed, which in the present case had been the taxpayer's supplier. 

Contract – Construction of contract. The claimant applied for a declaration as to the meaning of a provision (the provision) concerning reinvestment criteria, as defined in a collective management agreement (CMA), which governed a collateralised loan obligation structure (the CLO). The first defendant had, under the CLO, raised €602m through the issues of 14 classes of notes (the notes). An issue arose as to whether money, representing unscheduled principal proceeds, were available for reinvestment, in circumstances where the notes had been downgraded by a ratings group in 2010 and, subsequently upgraded in 2012. The Chancery Division, dismissing the claim, held that, on its true construction, the provision was not satisfied if the senior notes had at any time been downgraded below their initial ratings. In view of a downgrade of the notes in 2010, the reinvestment criteria was incapable of being satisfied. 

Constitutional law – Heads of foreign states. The case concerned the first judgment in the United Kingdom on whether personal immunity survived a sovereign following his death. The claimant widow of the deceased former King of Saudi Arabia brought a claim in the United Kingdom against his son, the defendant prince, for breach of contract. The prince applied for a declaration that the English court lacked jurisdiction, relying on his late father's alleged immunity as a sovereign head of state, under the State Immunity Act 1978. The Chancery Division, dismissing the application, held that a sovereign who had died in office did not remain the embodiment of the state once deceased. Accordingly, the Prince could not rely on a defence of state immunity to defeat the claimant's claim.