Latest Cases

Employment – Discrimination. Following the judgment of the Supreme Court in Seldon v Clarkson Wright & Jakes (see [2012] 3 All ER 1301), the case returned to the employment tribunal (the tribunal) for a decision as to whether the selection by the employer solicitors' firm of the compulsory age of 65 for retirement had been proportionate to achieve its aims of retention and workforce planning. The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the tribunal's decision that the choice of age 65 had been proportionate. 

European Union – Directives. The proceedings concerned a tendering process carried out by the respondent Common Services Agency in 2010 in respect of the provision of medical services to health authorities in Scotland. The appellant submitted that, among other things, the court below had erred in treating the reasonably well-informed and diligent tenderer (the RWIND tenderer) as a hypothetical construct, and in applying the RWIND tenderer standard according to the court's assessment of what a hypothetical RWIND tenderer would have done or thought. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the claim, held that the question could not be determined by evidence, as it depended on the application of a legal test rather than being a purely empirical enquiry. 

Landlord and tenant – Recovery for possession. The appellant had rented a house from her parents under an assured shorthold tenancy. The parents had fallen into arrears on the mortgage and the lender appointed receivers who then issued a possession notice. They later issued possession proceedings in the name of the parents as landlords. The possession order was granted and the appellant appealed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appeal and held that there was no clear and consistent line of Strasbourg jurisprudence that the proportionality test at art 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights did not apply to disputes between tenants and private landlords where the tenant relied on art 8. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The claimant applied for leave to remain in the United Kingdom and for an application fee waiver under the defendant Secretary of State's destitution fee waiver policy. The Secretary of State rejected the application, refusing to waive the application fee as the claimant did not qualify for a waiver. The claimant sought judicial review. The Administrative Court, in allowing the application, held that the policy was unlawful in that the refusal to waive the application fee was incompatible with the claimant's rights under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Contract – Illegality. The claimant sought the repayment of funds paid to the defendant for the purposes of an illegal agreement for insider dealing in shares, which had been frustrated. The judge dismissed his claim on the basis that it was barred by illegality. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the appeal, held that the judge had not been wrong to find that the claimant had needed to rely on any illegality in making his claim. However, it was open to the claimant to rely on the wholly unperformed illegal agreement and be entitled to recover his money, as genuine repentance on the part of the withdrawer was not required. 

Mental health – Court of Protection. N was a woman in her early fifties who, following a brain haemorrhage was in a minimally conscious state and lacked capacity to make decisions as to her medical treatment. She resisted intervention particularly feeding through a tube and removed the tube at every opportunity. It was against this background that the National Health Service Trust applied to the court seeking an order from the court. The Court of Protection held that it was not in N's best interests to provide her with artificial nutrition. 

Charity – Charitable trust. Concerns were raised about the administration of a charitable trust. In August 2011, the Charity Commission for England and Wales (the Commission) commenced an inquiry into the trust. On the 6 June 2013, the first defendant was appointed as an interim manager. The Commission applied to the Chancery Division for directions. The Chancery Division held that, among other things, donations made to the trust were impressed with a trust of a general nature, and that the most appropriate way of distributing the trust fund would be a single pari passu distribution of the entire fund. 

Extradition – Extradition order. The respondent judicial authority sought the appellant's extradition to Germany to face prosecution for people trafficking. The appellant had a 12-year-old daughter who had disabilities. The district judge made an order for the appellant's extradition and the appellant appealed. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that extradition would not be a disproportionate interference with the appellant's or her daughter's rights under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Criminal law – Trial. Three defendants were convicted of murder by joint enterprise in connection with the shooting death of the deceased. A verdict of not guilty to murder was entered in respect of a fourth defendant, who pleaded guilty to robbery and was sentenced to 92 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, refused two defendants leave to appeal against conviction. However, it allowed the appeal against sentence of the defendant in connection with the robbery charge where the judge had based the sentence on a finding which, in law, he had not been entitled to make. 

Solicitor – Law Society. The Law Society had intervened in the defendant solicitor's practice. The defendant entered into an Individual Voluntary Arrangement (IVA), excluding work in progress. Amounts owed to him were agreed with former clients and paid into court (the fund). The Law Society contended that it was entitled to the fund. A master ordered the fund to be paid to the defendant. The Chancery Division, dismissing the Law Society's appeal, held that, in view of the IVA, the Law Society had had no claim against the claimant for intervention costs and it could not contend that the statutory trust had empowered it to satisfy the claim from sums vesting in it. There was no justification for any part of the fund being paid to the Law Society in respect compensation paid to the defendant's former client from the fund.