Latest Cases

Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. There was an application before the court on behalf of the defendant pursuant to CPR 39.3(5) seeking an order setting aside the judgment and order made on 30 June, striking out the defendant's defence and giving judgment for the claimant. The Queen's Bench Division, applying established principles dismissed the application on the basis that the defendant had failed to demonstrate the first two of the three conditions which it needed to overcome in order to persuade the court to exercise its discretion under CPR 39.3(5). 

Criminal law – Conspiracy. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, considered an application by the Attorney General in respect of H, who had been convicted of three counts of conspiracy to defraud and one count of retaining a wrongful credit, and S, who had been convicted of two counts of conspiracy to defraud, and held their sentences had been unduly lenient given the extent and circumstances of the offending in what had been a profound misuse of the professional training of both men. Both men were legal professionals and had fraudulently obtained mortgages. H's sentence was varied to a concurrent term of six years and three months' imprisonment in respect of counts 1, 2 and 2 and a concurrent term of nine months' imprisonment in respect of count 4. S's sentences were ordered to run consecutively, with an overall term of three years' imprisonment. 

Natural justice – Duty to act fairly. The defendant, the London Metal Exchange, decided, following a consultation process, to implement a new rule (the LILO rule)and excluded the possibility of a rent ban option. The claimant, United Company Rusal Plc, sought judicial review. The judge held that, inter alia, as the rent ban was the next best option, consultees had to know the reasons why it had been rejected in order properly to understand the LILO rule. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the defendant's appeal, held that, inter alia, the defendant had correctly disclosed the true reasons for the LILO rule and it had had no obligation to put forward a proposal which it was not willing to promote. 

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. In proceedings between the mother and father, the Family Division made certain findings of fact. The children had been taken to England from Pakistan in both 2011 and 2012 because that was what the father and his family decided should happen. The removals were unilateral and thus unlawful actions with grave and long lasting consequences for the children's relationship with their mother. The mother cared deeply for them and was entirely committed to their welfare. Nevertheless, the children would not be restored to the habitation of their mother. 

Town and country planning – Enforcement notice. The first respondent Secretary of State's inspector dismissed the appellant's appeal against an enforcement notice on the basis that there had been no continuous breach of planning control for a period of four years. The appellant appealed. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that there was no discernible basis upon which the inspector had fallen into error. 

Judgment – Default judgment. The claimant bank had obtained judgment in default of acknowledgement of service against the Italian regional authority. The bank then issued separate proceedings claiming substantial sums allegedly due to it and applied for summary judgment. The bank was successful in its application. The Italian authority failed in its application to have the default judgment set aside. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, refused the Italian authority's application for permission to appeal against the refusal of its application to set aside and, in doing so, commented upon the applicability of Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Denton v TH White Ltd; Decadent Vapours Ltd v Bevan; Utilise TDS Ltd v Davies to applications to set aside a default judgment. 

Immigration – Deportation. The proceedings concerned an appeal against the decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) allowing the respondent Secretary of State's appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (FTT), which had itself allowed the appellant's appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State to make a deportation order against him pursuant to s 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. The Court of Appeal Civil Division, in dismissing the appeal, held that the Upper Tribunal was right to find that the FTT had erred in law and had, itself, reached a decision to which it could properly have come on the evidence before it. 

Patent – Practice. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, considered an appeal against a decision to grant summary judgment in favour of the defendant in proceedings for patent infringement. The court rejected the claimant's contention that the judge had wrongly granted summary judgment without the benefit of hearing expert evidence which would throw light upon the issues of construction and infringement. 

Immigration – Detention. The claimant Turkish national sought damages for unlawful immigration detention for over ten months. The Administrative Court held that there had been a breach of r 34 of the Detention Centre Rules 2001, SI 2001/238, by failing to conduct a medical examination within 24 hours of his admission to immigration detention. However, even if such examination had been carried out on the claimant's admission to immigration detention, that would not have affected the decision to continue to detain him. Accordingly, the claimant was only entitled to nominal damages. 

Costs – Order for costs. The claimants brought a single claim alleging that the defendant companies had infringed their patent. The court in earlier proceedings found in favour of the claimants. The claimants contended that they were entitled to a sum in excess of the sum capped for proceedings in the Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court and contended that CPR 63.17A had to be taken to mean that the cap of £500,000 applied separately to each defendant. The court held that the cap of £500,000 was absolute, unless the parties agreed otherwise and the court had no discretion to lift it. Accordingly, the cap applied to the claim against both defendants.