Latest Cases

Passing off – Clothes. The defendant retailer, Topshop, had sold a t-shirt with an image of the pop star Rihanna. The t-shirt was not officially endorsed by her and while the photograph had been licensed to Topshop by the photographer, it had been taken during a video shoot for the star's new album. Rihanna successfully issued proceedings for passing off. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed Topshop's appeal as the judge had not made any error in his identification of the relevant law or his application of it to the present case. 

European Union – Jurisdiction. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that art 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 should be interpreted as meaning that, in the event of an allegation of infringement of copyright and rights related to copyright guaranteed by the member state of the court seised, that court had jurisdiction, on the basis of the place where the damage had occurred, to hear an action for damages in respect of an infringement of those rights resulting from the placing of protected photographs online on a website accessible in its territorial jurisdiction. That court had jurisdiction only to rule on the damage caused in the member state within which the court was situated. 

Legal aid – Entitlement. The claimant issued judicial review proceedings, contending that the defendant Lord Chancellor had exceeded his powers, under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, when making reg 33 of the Civil Legal Aid (Procedure) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/3098. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the application, held that reg 33 of the Regulations was not ultra vires, as the Lord Chancellor had a wide power, which was not limited to procedural matters. Further, reg 33 of the Regulations had not thwarted or frustrated the Act's purpose, but was consistent with it by ensuring that the domestic violence exception had been strictly confined to its intended scope and not exploited. 

European Union – Intellectual property rights. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that art 4(2) of Directive (EC) 2001/29 (on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society) had to be interpreted as meaning that the rule of exhaustion of the distribution right set out in art 4(2) of that directive did not apply in a situation where a reproduction of a protected work, after having been marketed in the EU with the copyright holder's consent, had undergone an alteration of its medium, such as the transfer of that reproduction from a paper poster onto a canvas, and was placed on the market again in its new form 

Divorce – Financial provision. In the course of proceedings regarding financial relief applications, the husband sought to strike out the grant of leave given to the wife to make applications for financial remedy orders. The Family Division held that, in the circumstances, it would not be appropriate to set aside the grant of leave or strike out the proceedings. 

Land – Acquisition of title by possession. The issue on the appeal was whether an application for a person to be registered, under the Land Registration Act 2002, as the proprietor of a registered estate in land by reason of a period of adverse possession was valid, where part of the relevant period of possession consisted of the occupation of a residential building in circumstances constituting the commission of a criminal offence, under s 144 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO). The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that the enactment of s 144 of LASPO, and the commission of an offence under it, did not have any material effect on the operation on the law of adverse possession. 

Criminal law – Trial. The justices refused the prosecution's application for an adjournment of the respondent's trial for driving with excess alcohol in his breath to obtain playable CCTV footage and stayed the proceedings on the ground of abuse of process. The prosecution appealed by way of case stated. The Divisional Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the justices had been correct in law in refusing the prosecution's request to adjourn the trial. However, they had erred in acceding to the respondent's request to stay the case. Further, the court gave guidance on the scope of appellate review of justices' case management decisions. 

Children's hearing – Proceedings before children's hearing – 'Relevant person'. Court of Session: Allowing appeals against a sheriff's decision confirming a pre-hearing panel's decision deeming the foster carers of two siblings to be 'relevant persons' for the purposes of proceedings respecting them, the court held that the sheriff had erred in considering that any decision taken by a pre-hearing panel on the question whether an individual might qualify standing as a 'relevant person' required to have the welfare of the child in question as its paramount consideration, and furthermore the pre-hearing panel had not given the detailed consideration to the foster carer relationship which was required before they could hold that the foster carers had had a significant involvement in the upbringing (as opposed to care) of the children in question. 

Data protection – Processing of information. The claimant had put forward his own name twice unsuccessfully to the defendant House of Lords appointment commission. The claimant brought seeking disclosure of two unsolicited letters sent to the defendant under the Data Protection Act 1998. His claim was opposed by the defendant. The Queen's Bench Division held that the information was exempted information and dismissed the claim. 

Civil procedure – Jurisdiction – Recovery of information. Court of Session: Refusing a reclaiming motion by petitioners who had asked the court to order disclosure of the identity of two users of the respondent's website who, it was averred, posted defamatory matter about them and their guest house, the court concluded that the Lord Ordinary was correct to sustain the respondents' plea of no jurisdiction, as the Scottish courts did not have jurisdiction over the respondents, a company incorporated under the law of Massachusetts who had their principal place of business there, and the clause in the respondents' terms and conditions prorogating the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts courts applied to the application.