Latest Cases

European Union – Trade marks. The General Court of the European Union allowed the action brought by Natura Selection, SL, (Natura) against a decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), relating to opposition proceedings between Natura and Afoi Anezoulaki AE (Afoi) concerning the application by Afoi to register the word sign 'natur' as a Community trade mark. 

Insurance – Claim. A fire occurred at the claimant company's premises. The defendant insurer avoided the policy, on the ground that R, the director of the claimant, or someone working on his behalf, had started the fire. The London Mercantile Court held that, on the evidence, the defendant had clearly shown to the appropriate standard that R, or someone acting on his behalf, had deliberately caused the fire. 

Land registration – Caution. The defendant children of the deceased had been excluded from his will and brought, or sought to bring, claims alleging interest in the deceased's estate. They applied to the land registry for a caution against first registration of property forming part of the estate. The application was granted in respect of a farm and another property. The executor of the deceased's estate applied for an order that the chief registrar to the land registry be directed to cancel the caution. The Chancery Division, in granting the application, held that, whilst the defendants' claims under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975 could not be dismissed as not seriously arguable, they would be unable to compensate the estate for any loss which it might suffer as a result of the caution remaining in place. 

Immigration – Rules. The claimant Nigerian national sought judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's decision, refusing her application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom as a Tier 4 (General) student. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the application, held that the effect of the transitional arrangement as contained in the Immigration Rules had been clear and that they had not resulted in unfairness to the claimant. Further, there had been no unfairness in the Secretary of State's decision not to exercise her discretion outside the Immigration Rules so as to grant a Tier 4 visa in the circumstances of the case. 

Divorce – Jurisdiction. In divorce proceedings which were taking place in two separate jurisdictions, United Kingdom an France, the Family Division decided to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union on the correct application of art 19 of Council Regulation 2201/2003 to the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 

Bankruptcy and Insolvency – Bankruptcy. The first defendant owed a debt to the second defendant local authority. By a consent order, a judge set aside a bankruptcy order made against the first defendant on the basis that security had been offered by way of a charge on his home. The applicant trustee in bankruptcy applied for an order that the consent order should be rescinded, pursuant to s 375 of the Insolvency Act 1986, relying on alleged debts owed to unsecured creditors, which had not been brought to the court's attention. A district judge ruled that he had no jurisdiction to order rescission of an order made by the High Court and the matter was transferred to the Chancery Division. That court, dismissing the application, held that, applying Appleyard v Wewelwala[2013] 1 All ER 1383, s 375(1) of the Act did not empower review of an order made by a judge of the High Court on appeal under s 375(2) of the Act. In so far as other unsecured creditors might be affected by the provision of the security to a petitioner, it was neither necessary nor appropriate for their interests to be addressed in the context of the issue of whether, where security was offered and rejected, a bankruptcy order should be made or refused. 

Company – Scheme of arrangement. An application was made to the Companies Court for the approval of an insurance business transfer scheme under which the long-term insurance business of Prudential Annuities Ltd was to transferred to the Prudential Assurance Company Ltd. The court held that, on the evidence, the scheme would be sanctioned. 

Town and country planning – Permission for development. The claimant challenged the grant of planning permission for the erection of a wind turbine in the Norfolk Broads. The Planning Court, in dismissing the application, held that the inspector appointed by the first defendant Secretary of State had complied with his statutory duty with respect to the Broads and had properly applied the relevant planning policies. Further, the condition as to noise had not been irrational and the grant of planning permission had not specified the model of turbine. 

Trade mark – Infringement. The proceedings concerned the use of the words 'Ideal Home' as, or as part of, a trade mark for online mail order retailing services. The judge dismissed the claim brought by the claimant, IPC, against the defendant, Media 10, for infringement of its registered trade mark and dismissed Media 10's counterclaim for rectification of the register. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed both IPC's appeal and Media 10's cross-appeal. It held that the judge had been entitled to reject the claim for infringement of the registered trade mark and that Media 10 had wholly failed to establish that normal and fair use of the mark by IPC, in relation to online retail services, could ever have been prevented by an action for passing off. 

Architect – Registration. The appellant architect appealed against the respondent Architects Registration Board's Professional Conduct Committee's (the PCC) decision that he was guilty of unacceptable professional conduct and the issue of a reprimand. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the PCC had had jurisdiction as the appellant had been registered and that an architect acting under the Party Wall etc Act 1996 had the same obligations as in other matters. Further, the PCC had been entitled to find the appellant's breach had constituted unacceptable professional conduct and to impose the reprimand.