Latest Cases

Town and country planning – Enforcement notice. The appellant appealed against an order dismissing: (i) his application to quash the decision of the inspector, appointed by the first respondent Secretary of State, to dismiss his appeal against the second respondent local authority's refusal to grant planning permission for the redevelopment of a site; and (ii) his appeal against the inspector's decision to dismiss his appeal against an enforcement notice issued by the authority in respect of the site and to uphold the notice with variations. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held, inter alia, that two different versions of a plan had been produced by the appellant and by the authority before the inspector. Extrinsic evidence had plainly been admissible to resolve the factual issue as to which of the two plans had been referred to in the planning permission. As to the enforcement notice, there had been a legally defective variation notice which the authority had had the power to and had withdrawn and corrected before the appeal had been decided by the judge. 

Criminal law – Detention in custody. The claimant sought judicial review of the decision to extend his custody time limit. The Divisional Court held that, although no judicial consideration had been given to whether there had been 'good and sufficient cause' for extending the custody time limit, the decision of the first judge to fix a trial date beyond the expiry of the custody time limit had not been amenable to judicial review by virtue of s 29(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Further, the discrete decision of the second judge to extend the time limit contained no discernible error. 

Title to land – Title to sue. Court of Session: Refusing an appeal from the sheriff principal in an action in which the pursuers sought to remove the defender from land, averring they were pro indiviso proprietors of the land and that he occupied it without right or title, and he denied that they owned the land but asserted no right or title himself, the court held that the pursuers, or one or other of them, had an ex facie valid title which was good enough to pursue an action against a defender who advanced no competing writ. 

Criminal evidence – Admissibility of evidence. High Court of Justiciary: Refusing an appeal by an appellant against her conviction for possession of a controlled drug on the basis that her detention by police officers was unlawful, and thus evidence of her possession of heroin should not have been allowed, the court held that the officers had reasonable grounds for suspecting that the appellant was involved in a drugs offence: a reasonable person in possession of all the information available to the detaining officers would have suspected criminal behaviour. 

Solicitor – Negligence. The claimant retained the defendant solicitors' firm in relation to a property transaction. Matters did not go well for the claimant and he brought a claim in negligence against the defendant alleging breach of duty of care. The defendant denied the allegation. The Queen's Bench found that the claimant had failed to prove any breach of duty on the part of the defendant in relation to any of the grounds alleged against it and so the claim failed in its entirety. 

Medical practitioner – Professional misconduct. The claimant was a consultant in general and colorectal surgery employed by the defendant Trust. Concerns about his clinical practice began to emerge and the defendant notified the claimant that it considered that there was a prima facie case of gross misconduct by him and a disciplinary panel would be constituted. The defendant provided its management case twelve 12 working days before the disciplinary hearing was due to commence. The claimant sought an adjournment and when the panel refused the claimant sought an injunction preventing the defendant from continuing in the hearing. The Queen's Bench Division refused the injunction holding that there was no good reason to intervene in the discretion of the panel. 

Public procurement – Public contracts. When the government proposed to change its method of delivery of tax-free child care, so as to use of internal rather than external methods the claimant stood to lose out commercially. The claimant challenged the decision under the Public Contracts Regulations 2006, SI 2006/5 and art 56 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the grounds that the arrangements between the two government departments would involve the conclusion of a public services contract within the meaning of the Regulations or economic opportunity falling within art 56 TFEU; or alternatively that the arrangements would involve a material variation of an existing public services contract. The Queen's Bench Division dismissed the claims. 

Negligence – Duty to take care. A wall dividing the claimants' and the defendants' gardens collapsed. The claimants brought proceedings. The judge ordered, inter alia, that the parties owed to each other a measured duty of care in respect of the consequences attendant upon the collapse of the wall and that, in respect of any engineering or other solution which might be devised to deal with the consequences, the contribution of the defendants was to be a rateable proportion of the cost of such solution. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the defendants' appeal, held that, in the circumstances, the judge had been entitled to have found that there had been measured duties of care on both sides, but it had not been just and reasonable to have imposed on the defendants a liability to contribute to the cost of some unspecified engineering solution. 

Sentence – Imprisonment. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that concurrent sentences of seven months' imprisonment for drugs offences committed whilst in prison had been unduly lenient, and ordered that each sentence should run consecutively to existing sentences being served. 

Hospital – Liability for negligence of members of staff. The claimant issued proceedings, contending that the defendant NHS Foundation Trust had handled her birth process negligently, resulting in her having a limited range of motion in her right arm. The Queen's Bench Division held that negligence was established, as the decision not to proceed to caesarean section at 13:50 had lacked logical force. However, the claimant had not established that the delivery had been negligently handled.