Latest Cases

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. Following a series of catalogue of errors, omissions, delays and serial breaches of court orders in respect of a very young child, DS, who had been placed in foster care the authority agreed to pay damages: (i) to DS in the sum of £12,000; (ii) to the mother in the sum of £4,000; and (iii) to pay a sum of £1000 to the maternal grandparents to assist them in their care of DS. The basis of the award was arts 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

Libel and slander – Malice. The claimant Member of Parliament brought proceedings for libel against the defendant newspaper publisher. The claim contained allegations of malice. TNL applied to strike out the claim of malice. The Queen's Bench Division held that, among other things, the allegations had failed to plead clearly and distinctly the factual case relied on to establish dishonesty on the part of the two journalists concerned, and that the application to strike out would succeed. 

Town and country planning – Permission for development. The claimant local planning authority applied to quash the decision of the inspector appointed by the first defendant Secretary of State, holding that administrative fees it had claimed for monitoring obligations agreed under s 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 did not comply with reg 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948. The Planning Court, in dismissing the application, held that the inspector had been entitled to conclude that a contribution to the administration and monitoring costs had not been 'necessary' to make the development acceptable in planning terms. Further, the inspector had given adequate reasons. 

Employment – Contract for services. The claimant colorectal, laparoscopic and general surgeon was prohibited from carrying out all forms of surgery at the defendant NHS Trust. He issued proceedings for breach of contract. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the claim, held that his submission that he should not have been excluded from all surgery was unrealistic. The NHS Trust had been able to conclude that there had been no alternatives to exclusion and it had been entitled to maintain the exclusion. Further, the NHS Trust had been entitled not to permit the claimant to return to work, given the breakdown in the relationship and absent suitable supervision. 

European Union – Employment. The Court of Justice of the European Union made a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of the principle of sincere cooperation in art 10 EC in conjunction with the Conditions of Employment of other Servants of the European Communities, established by Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 259/68, as amended. The request had been made between the Belgian Office national de l'emploi and Ms Melchior concerning that body's refusal to grant Ms Melchior unemployment benefit. 

Licence – Licence to occupy premises. The claimant Secretary of State brought possession proceedings against the defendant following her failure to vacate a property which she had occupied with her then husband, under a licence granted to the husband. The judge rejected her arguments that: (i) the fact that Crown licensees had no security of tenure amounted to unlawful discrimination, under arts 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and (ii) the notice purporting to terminate the licence was invalid. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the defendant's appeal. On the facts, there had been no violation of the defendant's Convention rights, because there had been no relevant difference in treatment which had had an adverse effect on her, and the notice had validly terminated the licence. 

Police – Powers. The present appeal concerned the question of the circumstances in which DNA profiles obtained by the police in the exercise of their criminal law enforcement functions could, without the consent of the data subject, be put to uses which were remote from the field of criminal law enforcement. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, construed s 22 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1985 as meaning that, if the police considered that it was necessary to retain DNA material obtained under Pt II of PACE for criminal law enforcement purposes, they could not use it for any other purpose. 

Insurance – Motor insurance. The principal issue in an appeal from the Court of Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago was whether the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risk) Act of 1933 enabled someone who had suffered property damage caused by a motor vehicle accident to obtain indemnity from the vehicle owner's insurers when the driver, who had caused the damage, had not been not authorised by the insurance policy to drive the vehicle. The Privy Council, in allowing the insurer's appeal, held that the Act did not prevent the insurer from arguing that the terms of its insurance policy did not cover a claim where the driver of the vehicle had been unauthorised. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal had erred when it struck out Presidential's defence. The case was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration. 

Building contract – Subcontractors. The claimant company appointed the defendant company, HEC, to provide assistance in the development of a landfill site. A dispute arose as to which of the parties bore the contractual risk of increased costs associated with the enhancement of the design beyond the original delivery plan. The Technology and Construction Court held that it was appropriate to consider the making of declarations in the case, and made rulings concerning HEC's contractual obligations. 

Sentence – Suspended sentence. The offender had been given a suspended sentence for an offence of rape, the recorder having used his power under s 125(7) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to depart from the sentencing guideline in order to deal with a mentally disordered offender in the manner that he thought fit in the circumstances. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that, although the sentence had been unduly lenient at the time it was passed, it was not in the public interest that the sentence should be disturbed and no action would be taken, in circumstances where the offender had made a fully committed start to the suspended sentence order.