Latest Cases

Conflict of laws – Jurisdiction. The claimant had entered into contracts with clients that were subject to English law and jurisdiction. The clients issued proceedings against the claimant in Germany, resulting in the claimant paying damages. The claimant issued proceedings against the defendant German lawyers in England, alleging that they had induced the claimants to bring proceedings in Germany in breach of their contracts. The defendant was unsuccessful in its challenge against the jurisdiction of the English court. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the defendant's appeal, as the place where the claimant had suffered the damage which formed the basis of its claim was Germany. 

Practice – Striking out. The appellants appealed against the striking out of their proceedings for infringement of their rights under art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, by virtue of the employment tribunal's recusal. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the appeal, held that the immunity for a 'judicial act', under s 9(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, was not limited to acts or decisions which could be the subject of appeal or judicial review. On that basis, the judge had been correct to strike out the appellants' claims, notwithstanding the error in holding that s 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 had applied. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The appellant national of the United States (PG) appealed to the FTT against the refusal of her applications for entry clearance and for leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (the FTT) allowed her appeal and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (the tribunal) set aside the FTT's decision and determined that PG's claim under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights could not succeed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing PG's appeal, declined to uphold the tribunal's decision. However, the FTT had, inter alia, made a material error of law when it had purported to identify the relevant test. It followed that the FTT's decision was not sustainable and the case would be remitted to the tribunal to reconsider the decision as to art 8 of the Convention. 

Pensions – Pension scheme. The Chancery Division made a number of declarations regarding a proposed amendment to the rules of an occupational pension scheme. It held that, among other things: (i) the proposal would be allowed; (ii) the pension scheme had not become frozen for the purposes of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Deficiency on Winding Up etc) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/3188 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Employer Debt) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/678; and (iii) a cassation, under r 4 of the pension scheme, would not qualify as an employment cessation event, so as to trigger s 75 of the Pensions Act 1995. 

Town and country planning – Permission for development. The claimant local planning authority applied to quash the decision of the first defendant Secretary of State, allowing the second defendant developer's appeal and granting outline planning permission for up to 146 dwellings. The Planning Court, in allowing the application, held that the inspector had erred in finding that the local plan policy had come within para 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the NPPF) and it had been an error of law to seek to divide the policy so as to apply it only in part. The inspector would not have taken the approach he had, if he had concluded that the policy was to be given full effect. 

Criminal law – Murder. The deceased was killed as a consequence of a fight involving both defendants, C and P. It was the prosecution case that it had been a joint enterprise attack. The expert pathologist was unable to rule out the possibility that the first blow, administered by C, had caused the fatal brain injury. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, quashed the defendants' convictions for murder, in circumstances where P had been some distance away when the first blow was struck and a reasonable jury, properly directed could not have been sure that there had already been in place the necessary joint enterprise and the necessary intent. 

Sentence – Imprisonment. The offender was convicted of, among other things, indecent assault contrary to s 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (count 1). The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that it appeared that the sentencing judge had been overly influenced by the sentencing regime at the time the offending had been committed. The sentence in respect of count one was increased from four and-a-half years' imprisonment to eight and-a-half years' imprisonment. 

Mental health – Court of Protection. An issue arose regarding contact between an elderly man with dementia and a friend of his (M). Contact was opposed by the man's son and attorneys and advised against by his consultant. The local authority had conducted a best interests procedure which had determined that contact should not take place, but M wanted to maintain the relationship. Efforts at resolving the dispute failed, so the authority sought the permission of the Court of Protection to apply for determination of the dispute. The application was opposed by the son and attorneys. The court granted permission, as the factors in s 50 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 had been met. 

Employment – Victimisation. The employee appealed against interlocutory orders made by the employment tribunal at a Pre-Hearing Review at which the employer school sought to prevent the employee from pursuing to trial a large number of allegations of detriment for making protected disclosures and for trade union activities set out in a document put forward months after the ET1 and an 'Amended Particulars' document put forward well over a year after the ET1. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal, save only in relation to certain paragraphs of the Amended Particulars document. 

Costs – Security for costs. The claimant and first defendant were companies having shares in the same joint venture company. A number of disputes arose and the claimant issued proceedings. Both parties made applications for security for costs. The Chancery Division held that, on the evidence, the conditions were met for security for costs to be granted against the claimant, but not against the first defendant.