Latest Cases

Mental health – Court of Protection. Following the allowing of the first respondent's appeal by consent, the Court of Protection held that it appeared that the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, had taken a procedurally impermissible route. However, the allowing of the appeal was to be construed as setting aside its order that the first defendant had not been deprived of her liberty and saying that, if there was a situation of state detention, then it was authorised. The review ordered by the Court of Appeal was not of a determined situation of state detention, but a hearing de novo to determine if one existed. 

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. The mother appealed, supported by the father, against a care order and a placement order made in respect of their son, J, who was eight months old at the time of the hearing. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the appeal, held that the judicial analysis given to the case, as evidenced by the judgment, had been, by a wide margin, wholly inadequate. 

The claimant, who had diabetes, brought proceedings for negligence against the defendant health authority. She contended that, had she been told of the options available at the birth of her baby, she would have chosen a caesarian section, rather than to go ahead with a vaginal birth, which had resulted in injury to him. In allowing the claimant's appeal, the Supreme Court held that, among other things, the approach of the court in such cases, previously governed by the case of Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital ([1985] 1 All ER 643), was to be reconsidered. There could be no doubt that it had been incumbent on the claimants' obstetrician to advise her of the risks if she were to have her baby by vaginal delivery, and to discuss with her the alternative of delivery by caesarian section. In the circumstances, the claimant would probably have elected to be delivered of the baby by caesarian section. 

The pursuer had been seriously injured by a car when crossing the road. Her contributory negligence had been assessed at 90%. On appeal, her contributory negligence had been reduced to 70%. The Supreme Court held that the parties had been equally responsible for the damage suffered by the pursuer. Accordingly, the appeal would be allowed and 50% of the agreed damages would be awarded to the pursuer. 

Damages – Personal injury. The claimant suffered a serious injury whilst working the in defendant's garden. He brought a claim against the defendant for damages for breach of a duty of care on the basis that the relationship between the parties was akin to that of employer/employee. The Queen's Bench Division held that the relationship was not as alleged by the claimant and therefore the claim would be dismissed. 

Practice – Pre-trial relief. The claimant contended that the defendants had devised and executed a scheme to acquire, for their own benefit, shares and assets of two Russian companies to deprive it of the benefit of those assets as security for borrowing facilities and loans made to the original borrowers. The governing law of the torts alleged was that of Kazakhstan. The claimant was granted a freezing order in respect of the second defendant and an order for service outside of the jurisdiction. The Commercial Court discharged the freezing order and the order for service outside the jurisdiction where the claim had no realistic prospect of success because it was time-barred as a matter of Kazakh law and because of material non-disclosure. 

Child – Care. An urgent application was made for a collection order regarding a vulnerable child. She was taken to a police station at 7.30pm, but was not collected until 3.02am. The Family Division stated that it was not acceptable for such an application to be granted by a judge and only then for inquiries to be made as to placement and transportation. It was incumbent on authorities to ensure that robust processes were in place. 

Contract – Illegality. The claimant carried on business as business transfer agents. It was common ground that the activities of the claimant fell within the definition of the expression 'estate agency work' in s 1(1) of the Estate Agents Act 1979. The relevance of that was the reference to 'estate agents' in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007, SI 07/2157. The parties entered into an agreement and a dispute arose. The claimant brought a claim based on the agreement. The defendant contended that the agreement was not enforcible for illegality. Applying established law, the Queen's Bench Division held that the agreement was illegal and was consequently unenforceable. 

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the appellant association, which was concerned with the protection of the environment of the Shetland Islands, against the decision by the Inner House of the Court of Session to uphold the decision by the respondent Scottish Ministers to grant consent to developers for the construction and operation of a wind farm. The Court held, amongst other things, that, contrary to the decision of the Lord Ordinary, the duty of the respondents in considering such development proposals was not to conduct a full review of their functions under Directive (EC) 2009/147 (on the conservation of wild birds), but to take that directive into account as one of a number of material considerations in reaching a lawful decision whether to grant consent under the Electricity Act 1989. 

Human rights – Infringement of human rights. The present case concerned the determination of preliminary issues in claims involving allegations of ill-treatment, unlawful detention and unlawful killing of Iraqi civilians by British soldiers. The Administrative Court ruled on the circumstances in which art 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights applied. It further held that an investigative duty arose where there was an arguable breach of art 3 of the Convention and where an arguable violation of art 5 of the Convention amounted to an enforced disappearance. An investigative obligation under arts 2 or 3 of the Convention could not arise in circumstances where there had been no arguable substantive breach of arts 2 or 3 of the Convention.