Latest Cases

Medical practitioner – Professional conduct committee. The appellant appealed against the decision of the Fitness to Practise Panel (the Panel) of the respondent General Medical Council, holding that his fitness to practise was impaired and directing that his name be erased from the medical register. The Administrative Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the Panel had not been deprived of the ability to consider further evidence after it had adjourned to consider its factual findings on the issue of misconduct and had sent an embargoed draft of its findings to the parties, but had not yet handed down those findings. The Panel's refusal to admit the evidence of one witness had caused a real risk of injustice. 

Housing – Homeless person. The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant local authority's decision to refuse him public housing on the basis that he lacked capacity. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the application, held that it was bound by authority to the effect that that there was no purpose in making an offer of accommodation to a person so disabled that he was unable to comprehend or evaluate the offer. Further, under the Housing Act 1996 and the National Assistance Act 1948, a need for accommodation was a prerequisite. As the claimant continued to reside with his father, his need for accommodation was met. 

Insolvency – Administration order. The applicant, in his capacity as a creditor of the company for the purposes of para 12(1)(c) of Sch B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, sought an administration order to take effect retrospectively from November 2010. The court was being asked to make a retrospective order which would cure the fact of the void appointments of the purported present liquidators, by casting back over four years and validating the actions of those individuals, not as liquidators, but as administrators, in the intervening period, with a view to the company being moved by those freshly appointed administrators into creditors' voluntary liquidation. The Chancery Division held that, in the circumstances, the only appropriate outcome for the present administration application was to make an order for the compulsory winding-up of the company. 

Practice – Appeal. In deciding whether the appellant should be allowed time for appealing a settlement order under art 43 of Council Regulation EC 44/2001 (the Judgments Regulation), the Queen's Bench Division held that there was no general power to extend the mandatory two month time limit for appealing. The court was obliged to enforce that time limit strictly, subject only to the residual power to extend a mandatory time limit in the rare case where its application would impair the very essence of the right of appeal. 

Medical practitioner – Disciplinary panel. The appellant Professional Standards Authority referred to the Administrative Court the decision of the Conduct and Competence Committee (the CCC) of the first respondent Health and Care Professions Council (the Council), imposing a caution order for a period of five years for bullying and sexual harassment. The court, in dismissing the appeal, upheld the CCC's findings on three allegations and found it would be a gross breach of fair hearing procedure to allow their amendment after the evidence had been heard. Further, the sanction imposed by the CCC had not been unduly lenient, and its reasons had been intelligible and sufficient. 

Value added tax – Input tax. The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (the tribunal) dismissed the appeal by the taxpayer company against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) that the fact that missing trader intra-community fraud had not been established by the Revenue and Customs Commissioners did not preclude the Revenue from denying the recovery of input tax. However, the tribunal further decided that the FTT had been wrong in its finding that the taxpayer should have carried further checks 'down the chain', as that would have been a 'formidable task'. 

Medical practitioner – Disciplinary proceedings. The claimant general practitioner applied to terminate an interim order of suspension made against him, pending his trial for blackmail. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the application, held that the serious nature of the allegations meant that there was a real likelihood of serious damage to public confidence in the profession if the claimant was allowed to continue to practise pending trial. It had been in the public interest for an interim order of suspension to be made, and any breach of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights had been justified and proportionate. 

Extradition – Extradition order. The appellant appealed against orders for his extradition to Poland to serve a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for credit card fraud, fraud by false representation, using a false ID card and providing falsified customs clearance documents committed in 2001. The Administrative Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the judge had been entitled to conclude that the delay had not been culpable. However, he had erred in failing to have regard or sufficient regard to the impact of the appellant's extradition on his son, particularly, as the circumstances went to reduce the public interest in the appellant's extradition. 

Local government – Council tax. The appellant appealed against the decision of a panel of the Valuation Tribunal for England (the Panel), finding that she had not produced any substantive evidence to support her contention that her flat had truly been derelict and, therefore, it had remained a hereditament for council tax purposes. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the hearing had not been unfair and the Panel had applied the correct legal test. Further, the Panel's decision had not been wrong, irrational and in breach of the appellant's human rights. 

Privilege – Legal professional privilege. The present proceedings concerned whether certain passages in the claimants' re-amended particulars of claim should be struck out on the basis that they referred to matters protected by legal professional privilege. The Chancery Division, in dismissing the application, held, inter alia, that privilege in the relevant documents had been waived by the fourth defendant and, failing that, the third defendant.