Latest Cases

Sentence – Confiscation order. The Administrative Court held that, although a person the subject of a confiscation order was entitled to know the balance outstanding, that information had already been supplied to the defendant. The application was, in reality, an attempt to challenge the figure outstanding and to argue about the enforcement receiver's remuneration. Further, realised sums were not to be paid towards the confiscation order before paying the receiver's remuneration and, whilst it was likely to be appropriate to order the proper assessment of the receiver's remuneration, the present application was premature. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's failure to grant him leave as a Tier 4 (General) student migrant, after his appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (the FTT) against a prior decision had been allowed. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), in dismissing the application, held that the Secretary of State's decision to defer consideration of the claimant's application for 60 days had been an entirely reasonable response to the FTT's decision. Her further grant of 60 days' discretionary leave outside the Immigration Rules on an exceptional basis added weight to the view that the Secretary of State had acted reasonably. 

Sentence – Suspended sentence. The offender, aged 77, had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity to ten counts of indecent assault, contrary to s 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, suspended. The offending had taken place during the late 1960s and early 70s, when the complainants were both under the age of 14. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, held that the judge had made too great an allowance for the mitigating features and had paid insufficient attention to the current guidelines. The suspension was removed and the offender was ordered to serve an immediate custodial sentence of two years' imprisonment. 

Solicitor – Disciplinary proceedings. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (the SDT) found allegations against the appellant proved, and ordered the appellant to be suspended for two years and to pay £4,000 in costs. The appellant appealed against the sanction. The Administrative Court, in allowing the appeal, held that a suspension for two years would only be appropriate where the facts had been close to warranting an order striking the solicitor off. In the present case, the period of suspension had been much too long and the appropriate period of suspension was one year. However, a one-year condition would be attached to the appellant's practising certificate. 

Practice – Family proceedings. The husband and wife separated and a consent order was made regarding ancillary relief. Shortly after, the husband's father died and the husband received an inheritance. The wife appealed against the consent order, relying on the principle in Barder v Caluori ([1987] 2 All ER 440), in particular, that the inheritance was a Barder event, which invalidated the basis or fundamental assumption upon which the order had been made. The judge allowed the appeal and varied the order. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in dismissing the husband's appeal, held that the judge had not erred in having found that the death of the husband's father and the husband's consequent inheritance had invalidated the basis or fundamental assumption upon which the consent order had been made. 

Company – Winding up. The Revenue and Customs Commissioners (the Revenue) presented a creditor's petition to wind up the applicant company based on assessment for alleged unpaid corporation tax and alleged VAT fraud. The company appealed against the Revenue's tax assessments and applied to dismiss petition on the basis that the debt was disputed in good faith on substantial grounds. The Companies Court held that, on the evidence, the applicant's appeal had no real prospect of success and the application for the petition to be dismissed was, therefore, dismissed. 

Bankruptcy – Appeal. The Chancery Division considered an appeal by the petitioning creditor, W, against findings of the Chief Registrar regarding a bankruptcy order and a statutory demand made against the respondent wife and husband respectively. In dismissing the appeal, the court held that, using the correct test, the wife's application to annul the bankruptcy order would be allowed and that the other issues raised by W required further examination at a full hearing. 

Patent – Practice. The claimant company, TT, was the proprietor of a patent for a ticketing system. It entered into a dispute with the defendant company, BB, as to whether BB needed to use its ticketing system and intimating patent infringement proceedings. BB sought pre-action disclosure of information from TT, including the prices of licensing its system to its various customers. TT resisted the application. The Patents Court held that the rules in CPR 31.16(3) were satisfied and that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion with regard to licences issued by TT in the transport sector. 

Bankruptcy – Sequestration. Sheriff Court: In sequestration proceedings in which the respondent argued that sequestration should not be granted because the existence of a standard security in the petitioners' favour over subjects owned by her brother-in-law met the terms of s 12(3A) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 in that she had thereby given or shown that there was 'sufficient security for the payment of' the debt in question, the court rejected that argument, concluded that the sheriff had erred in dismissing petition and refusing sequestration, and awarded sequestration. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The claimant sought judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's decision, refusing him leave to remain in the United Kingdom, based on his rights under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, he relied on letters of support from responsible figures within his local community. The Administrative Court, in allowing the application, held that, had there been a full consideration of the material concerning art 8 of the Convention, the decision might not have been the same. Further, the Secretary of State's supplementary decision failed to deal with relevant factors raised in the letters.