Latest Cases

Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. The claimants appealed against two orders of two different masters on the basis of whether the orders properly gave permission to the defendant to amend his defence and counterclaim in the significant manner he purported to do and to withdraw admissions made in the original. The claimant contended that neither master complied with the Civil Procedure Rules in making these orders. The Queen's Bench Division held that while the masters might not have applied the rules precisely, the claimant had been treated fairly given the manner in which he had pursued his claim over the last 18 months. He was in as good a position to obtain the remedy or relief from the court he sought as he would have been had the masters approached the procedural issues differently. 

Employment – Unfair dismissal. The employee alleged against her former employer that she had not been paid the same as a male colleague. The employment tribunal upheld the employer's genuine material factor defence and dismissed the employee's equal pay claim and claims of sex discrimination and constructive unfair dismissal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in dismissing the employee's appeal, held that no error of law had been shown. On the facts and on limitation grounds, the sex discrimination claim failed. Further, the tribunal had made permissible findings on the facts in dismissing the constructive unfair dismissal claim. 

Debt – Statutory demand. The claimant appealed against a decision of a district judge dismissing his application to set aside a statutory demand. The debt itself was not disputed but the claimant relied on a cross-claim which did not equal the debt but fell short of it by less than £750. The Chancery Division held that a statutory demand should not necessarily be set aside under the residual discretion in r 6.5(4)(d) of the Insolvency Rules 1986, SI 1986/1925 simply because the undisputed part was less than £750. On the facts of the present case, the appropriate course was not to set aside the statutory demand under r 6.5(4)(d) of the Rules. 

Employment – Contract of service. The claimant had been a rector at the defendant's diocese. He had issued claims in the employment tribunal which raised the preliminary questions of whether he was either an employee for the purpose of s 230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 or a worker for the purpose of s 43K(1). The tribunal found that he was neither, but the Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed his appeal. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the Bishop's appeal and found that the tribunal had determined the issue of whether there had been an employment contract, it had correctly found that there had not been and nor had the claimant satisfied the definition of worker. 

European Union – Trade marks. The General Court of the European Union dismissed the action brought by SKYPE Ultd, established in Ireland, against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) concerning opposition proceedings between, on the one hand, British Sky Broadcasting Group plc and another company and Skype Ultd relating to the application for registration by the latter company of the word sign 'SKYPE' as a Community trade mark. 

Competition – Competition Appeal Tribunal. The Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled on the application by DSG Retail Ltd and its parent company for permission to serve out of the jurisdiction proceedings brought under s 47A of the Competition Act 1998. The tribunal decided that permission would be refused for service of the claim as presently pleaded alleging infringing acts by the defendants after a certain date, but was otherwise granted on the basis that the pleadings were amended in accordance with the present ruling. 

Town and country planning – Permission for development. The claimant challenged the decision of the first defendant Secretary of State to dismiss its appeal against the second defendant local planning authority's refusal of outline planning permission. The Planning Court, in allowing the application, held that: (i) the Secretary of State had failed to identify the nature and extent of any conflict with the neighbourhood plan; (ii) para 49 of the National Planning Policy Framework applied to an emerging development plan; (iii) the Secretary of State had failed to apply his policy on prematurity; and (iv) the Secretary of State had failed to apply his policy on the weight to be given to an emerging plan. 

Company – Winding up. The Revenue and Customs Commissioners (the Revenue) presented a creditor's petition to wind up the applicant company based on assessment for alleged unpaid corporation tax and alleged VAT fraud. The company appealed against the Revenue's tax assessments and applied to dismiss petition on the basis that the debt was disputed in good faith on substantial grounds. The Companies Court held that, on the evidence, the applicant's appeal had no real prospect of success and the application for the petition to be dismissed was, therefore, dismissed. 

Solicitor – Disciplinary proceedings. The Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (the SDT) found allegations against the appellant proved, and ordered the appellant to be suspended for two years and to pay £4,000 in costs. The appellant appealed against the sanction. The Administrative Court, in allowing the appeal, held that a suspension for two years would only be appropriate where the facts had been close to warranting an order striking the solicitor off. In the present case, the period of suspension had been much too long and the appropriate period of suspension was one year. However, a one-year condition would be attached to the appellant's practising certificate. 

Negligence – Causation. The claimant suffered a severe trauma to his knee and attended at the defendant Hospital for medical intervention. He underwent an operation and following the operation was unable to move his toes and foot. The claimant claimed damages in respect of the personal injury and loss which it was alleged was caused by the clinical negligence of the defendant NHS Trust. The Queen's Bench Division, following a testing of the claimant's evidence, allowed the claim.