Latest Cases

Trade mark – Distinctiveness. The Chancery Division considered the appellant company's appeal against the findings of a hearing officer in a dispute regarding trade marks used by the appellant for whisky-related products. The court held that the hearing officer had erred and reconsidered the likelihood of confusion with regard to a word mark and a logo mark. It held that, among other things, neither mark was likely to cause confusion. 

Practice – Summary judgment. The defendant Metropolitan Police Commissioner sought to strike out or summary judgment in, the claimants' claims for breach of contract, negligence and misfeasance in public office. The Queen's Bench Division, in granting the Commissioner's application, held that he was entitled to maintain legal professional privilege, as no joint retainer, joint interest or common interest privilege existed. Further, the Commissioner had not been negligent or assumed responsibility for the claimants' interests and nothing warranted an adjournment to allow the claimants to re-plead their case on misfeasance in public office. 

Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. CPR 45 provided for a fixed percentage by which the amount of a legal representative's fee could be increased in accordance with a conditional fee agreement ('CFA') which provided for a success fee. Section III dealt with road traffic accident claims. The defendant appealed from an order of which held that for the purpose of CPR 45.16 and 45.17 the trial of the action had commenced and accordingly the claimant was entitled to recover a success fee of 100% on base costs. The Queen's Bench Division, in allowing the appeal, held that the master had erred in treating the start of a hearing related to the liability issue as the start of the contested hearing of that issue. 

Personal injury – Liability – Damages. Court of Session: In an action by a motorcyclist who underwent a below-knee left leg amputation after he collided in darkness with a milk tanker which was reversing into a farm road and blocking the road on which he was travelling, the court concluded that the accident was caused partly by the fault of the pursuer and partly by the fault of the defenders, that the proportion of blame attributable to the pursuer fell to be assessed at 40%, and that damages for the cost of prosthetics must be calculated in accordance with the defenders' expert's recommendations. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The respondent Secretary of State refused the first and third appellants' applications for leave to remain under Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules and decided that there were no exceptional circumstances to warrant the grant of leave to remain outside the Rules, under art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) refused to grant them permission to seek judicial review. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appellants' appeals. In so doing, it considered, inter alia, the nature and application of the phrase 'insurmountable obstacles', as used in para EX.1 of Appendix FM to the Rules. 

Libel and slander – Defamatory words. The claimant, a member of the Moroccan royal family, brought proceedings against the defendant publisher regarding an article on its website. He submitted that the article had alleged that he had entered into a conspiracy to sabotage the image of the King of Morocco. The Queen's Bench Division held that the article had only been capable of bearing one of the three defamatory meanings pleaded. 

Immigration – Leave to remain – Right to family life. Court of Session: Allowing a reclaiming motion in judicial review proceedings in which a Pakistani national challenged a decision refusing to treat his further submissions as a fresh claim for leave to remain, the court held that the Home Secretary erred because her first decision letter did not provide the necessary assurance that she considered whether or not leave to remain should be granted outside the Immigration Rules, however the Lord Ordinary appeared to have overlooked the need to consider whether the error was a material one, and had she done so she would have been bound to find that the failure alleged was immaterial and, accordingly, also bound to dismiss the petition. 

Immigration – Detention. The claimant issued judicial review proceedings, challenging the lawfulness of his immigration detention by the defendant Secretary of State between 2 April and 1 July 2014. The Administrative Court, in allowing the application, held that the claimant was entitled to nominal damages for his detention until 6 April, as the Secretary of State had detained him under an inapplicable statutory power, but he would have been detained in any event. Further, his detention between 17 and 30 April had been unlawful, as he should have been removed to a secure psychiatric hospital. 

Negligence – Causation. The claimant broke his neck and was attended to by an ambulance crew, for whose actions the defendant was legally responsible. The assessment by the paramedic was negligent and it was only after he arrived at hospital that the correct diagnosis was made. The central issue to be determined was whether the admitted failure to immobilise the claimant's neck was responsible for at least part of his residual disability. The Queen's Bench Division held that, on the evidence, that there was evidence of both manhandling and deterioration in the case sufficiently compelling to support the conclusion that the manhandling was responsible for the deterioration. The claim therefore had to be quantified with reference to the 'but for' assessments of comparative function. 

Practice – Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. There was a dispute between the parties in their capacities as committee members of the Crawley Boxing Club. The claimant was the secretary and the defendant was the chairman. There was a falling out between them which, produced three claims from the claimant. There was before the court applications regarding the future management of the case including an application by the claimant for an adjournment on medical grounds. The Queen's Bench Division refused the adjournment applying established principles.