Latest Cases

Contract – Terms of contract. The Chancery Division ruled on whether a special purpose vehicle company (ARIC) had validly calculated its loss following the automatic early termination of a put option,which had been granted to it by the first defendant, Lehman Brothers Finance SA (LBF). The early termination had been triggered following the collapse of the Lehman's Brother's group. The court held that ARIC had validly calculated its loss in accordance with the relevant provisions of an International Swaps and Derivatives Association master agreement (1992 edition) and that, accordingly, the claimant was entitled to the payment from LBF of US$61,507,902, together with interest. 

Housing – Homeless person. The appellants had all applied for accommodation on the basis that they were in priority need, under s 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996. Their applications were refused and the appellants were unsuccessful before the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that, in order to decide whether an applicant fell within s 189(1)(c) of the Act, an authority or reviewing officer should compare him with an ordinary person if made homeless, not an ordinary actual homeless person. Further, when deciding if an applicant was 'vulnerable', one had to take into account such services and support that would be available to him he were homeless. It did not matter, at least in principle, whether the support was provided pursuant to a legal obligation. However, the question whether there was a legal obligation on the third party to provide the support could sometimes be relevant, in that it might be said to be intrinsically more likely that a person would continue to provide support if he had a legal obligation to do so. 

Costs – Security for costs. The claimant issued a claim in 2012, seeking a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of shares in an English company, which owned valuable land in Belarus. The third defendant (D3) applied to be joined to the proceedings in 2014 and counterclaimed for a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of the shares and that they were held on trust for him by the second defendant. D3 applied for security of costs. The master dismissed the application, among other things, on the grounds that D3 should have applied to join the proceedings as sooner and that there had been a delay in making the application. The Chancery Division upheld the master's decision on the grounds of delay, notwithstanding that it disagreed with other aspects of the master's decision, including in respect of her decision that the 'Crabtree principle' applied to the case. 

Town and country planning – Enforcement notice. The claimant local planning authority challenged the decision of the inspector appointed by the first defendant Secretary of State, varying an enforcement notice issued to the second defendant to require compliance with previously granted planning permission. The Planning Court, in allowing the application, held that it could not clearly be determined that the issue of whether the prior permission had still been extant had been addressed explicitly and an unambiguous decision reached. Further, the inspector had not had the power to act as he had in the particular circumstances. 

Human rights – Right to respect for private and family life. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the policy of the respondent Police Service of Northern Ireland to retain indefinitely the DNA profile, fingerprints and photographs of a person convicted of a recordable offence was in breach of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court held, in dismissing the appellant's appeal, that the policy was not in breach of art 8 of the Convention, as it was within the margin of appreciation and proportionate. 

Costs – Assessment. The claimant appealed from an order of a costs judge refusing to award an additional amount under CPR 36.14(3)(d) on a detailed assessment of costs. The Queen's Bench Division allowed the appeal on the basis that the master had misdirected himself and had relied on the degree of reduction made on assessment to the costs claimed as rendering it unjust to make such an award in circumstances in which the Pt 36 offer was lower than the sum at which the costs were assessed. 

Family proceedings – Jurisdiction. The local authority came before the court with a second set of care proceedings in respect of a child H. The first set of proceedings in respect of H had been transferred to Lithuania pursuant to art 15 of Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003. The Family Division held that it had jurisdiction in respect of the application for the care order made by the local authority and further, the court was not satisfied that the Lithuanian court would be better place to hear the English proceedings. 

Immigration – Leave to enter. The claimant Pakistani national sought judicial review of the defendant entry clearance officer's refusal of entry clearance as a Tier 4 (General) student based on his interview answers. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), in allowing the application, held that the decision-making process culminating in the refusal of the claimant's application had been manifestly unfair and the decision had been tainted by irrationality. It followed that the Case Worker Guidance relating to Tier 4 interviews and the genuine student rule had been breached to that extent. 

Maintenance of action – Champerty. In the course of proceedings, the defendant, B, applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it was champertous and that the claimant limited liability partnership, JEB, had been created as part of a scheme to cause maximum litigation inconvenience to B and to shield members of the partnership from adverse costs orders. The Chancery Division held that the claim did not offend the public policy aimed at protecting the legal process, and B's application to strike out the claim as an abuse of process would be dismissed. 

Contract – Construction of contract. The claimant investment bank was appointed, under contracts, as the financial adviser of the defendant, which owned, through its subsidiaries, the rights to develop and exploit mineral assets in Sierra Leone. The claimant brought a claim for the payment of fees allegedly due under the contracts. The judge held that, on the facts and the true construction of the contracts, the claimant was entitled to the payment of some of the fees sought. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the defendant's appeal as the judge had not given the relevant contractual term the correct interpretation.