Latest Cases

Contract – Terms. The claimant, a major European executive air charter operation, had provided aircraft management services to the defendant. The Chancery Division held that, on the true construction of an aircraft management and charter agreement between the claimant and the defendant, the claimant was entitled to judgment for the amount of charter incentive payments to which it had claimed to be entitled. The defendant was entitled to set off some, but not all, of the sums claimed from outstanding invoices in respect of management fees and operating costs. 

European Union – Trade marks. The General Court of the European Union ruled on the action brought by easyGroup IP Licensing Ltd (easyGroup) against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs), relating to opposition proceedings between Tui AG and easyGroup concerning the application by easyGroup to register a figurative sign depicting the words 'easyAir-tours' as a Community trade mark. 

Town and country planning – Enforcement notice. The claimants challenged the decision of the inspector appointed by the defendant Secretary of State, upholding an enforcement notice, but extending the period for compliance. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the application, held that the inspector's primary conclusion that the allegation in the enforcement notice was made out had not been detracted from or undermined. He had considered alternatives and his conclusions in that respect had been comprehensible. Further, his grant of further time had been a proportionate response. 

Shipping – Charterparty. The proceedings concerned a voyage charterparty made on the BEEPEEVOY 3 form. Clause 17 of the charterparty made provision for a laycan period. Clause 24 of the charterparty gave the charterers, after any load or discharge port or place had been nominated, a liberty to vary such port or place. While the vessel was on its way to the first load port, the charterers cancelled the charterparty. A dispute arose as to whether the charterers had a right to cancel. The tribunal found for the owners. The Commercial Court dismissed the charterers' appeal, and held that the tribunal had not erred in reaching the conclusion that it had done. 

Housing – Homeless person. The appellants had all applied for accommodation on the basis that they were in priority need, under s 189(1)(c) of the Housing Act 1996. Their applications were refused and the appellants were unsuccessful before the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that, in order to decide whether an applicant fell within s 189(1)(c) of the Act, an authority or reviewing officer should compare him with an ordinary person if made homeless, not an ordinary actual homeless person. Further, when deciding if an applicant was 'vulnerable', one had to take into account such services and support that would be available to him he were homeless. It did not matter, at least in principle, whether the support was provided pursuant to a legal obligation. However, the question whether there was a legal obligation on the third party to provide the support could sometimes be relevant, in that it might be said to be intrinsically more likely that a person would continue to provide support if he had a legal obligation to do so. 

Maintenance of action – Champerty. In the course of proceedings, the defendant, B, applied to strike out the claim on the basis that it was champertous and that the claimant limited liability partnership, JEB, had been created as part of a scheme to cause maximum litigation inconvenience to B and to shield members of the partnership from adverse costs orders. The Chancery Division held that the claim did not offend the public policy aimed at protecting the legal process, and B's application to strike out the claim as an abuse of process would be dismissed. 

Human rights – Right to respect for private and family life. The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the policy of the respondent Police Service of Northern Ireland to retain indefinitely the DNA profile, fingerprints and photographs of a person convicted of a recordable offence was in breach of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The court held, in dismissing the appellant's appeal, that the policy was not in breach of art 8 of the Convention, as it was within the margin of appreciation and proportionate. 

Immigration – Leave to remain. The claimants sought judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's decision to refuse them leave to remain as Tier 1 Entrepreneurs, relying on a legitimate expectation said to arise from a conversation over the Secretary of State's helpline. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), in dismissing the application, held that there was no doubt that the claimants had not had a legitimate expectation that their application would be granted. They had been given conflicting information, the conversation relied on had been incorrect and the telephone operator had had no authority to assure the outcome. 

European Union – Copyright. The Court of Justice of the European Union made a preliminary ruling, deciding that art 4(1) of Directive (EC) 2001/29 (on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society) had to be interpreted as meaning that it allowed a holder of an exclusive right to distribute a protected work to prevent an offer for sale or a targeted advertisement of the original or a copy of that work, even if it was not established that that advertisement had given rise to the purchase of the protected work by an EU buyer, in so far as that that advertisement invited consumers of the member state in which that work was protected by copyright to purchase it. 

Costs – Assessment. The claimant appealed from an order of a costs judge refusing to award an additional amount under CPR 36.14(3)(d) on a detailed assessment of costs. The Queen's Bench Division allowed the appeal on the basis that the master had misdirected himself and had relied on the degree of reduction made on assessment to the costs claimed as rendering it unjust to make such an award in circumstances in which the Pt 36 offer was lower than the sum at which the costs were assessed.