Latest Cases

Intellectual property – Design rights. The claimant and the first defendant were competing wholesalers of furniture, which they sold to retailers such as the second defendant. The claimant sought damages for loss allegedly arising from the defendants' sale of tables, allegedly infringing the claimant's design rights in respect of its own tables. By a Tomlin order, the defendants agreed that there should be an inquiry as to damages on the basis that they had infringed the claimant's unregistered European Union and United Kingdom design rights. The Intellectual Property and Enterprise Court ruled that, in relation to 20% of the sales of both tables by the first defendant, the claimant was entitled to the profit it would have made from sales of equal numbers of its own tables of equivalent design, plus the profit it would have made from sales of convoyed goods. In relation to the remaining 80% of sales of infringing tables by the first defendant, the claimant was entitled to damages of £100 per table. 

Libel and slander – Statement in open court. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, dismissed an appeal by the defendant Associated Newspapers against an order giving the claimant author permission to read a unilateral statement in open court following her acceptance of an offer of amends, under s 2 of the Defamation Act 1996. 

Land – Estates or interests capable of subsisting at law. The second defendant trustees owned a site of land over which the claimants had obtained a unilateral notice following the issuing of a claim. The notice inhibited the ability of the trustees to deal with their property. The trustees applied to cancel the notice. The Queen's Bench Division cancelled the notice as the basis of the notice was a money claim, namely for the introduction fee. Such a claim was not a proprietary claim and the notice had to be vacated pursuant to para 2 of Sch 4 of the Land Registration Act 2002. 

Trinidad and Tobago – Fatal accident. PB was killed in a motor vehicle accident. The appellant administratrix of her estate obtained judgment against the driver. The appellant raised an action against the respondent insurer, which pleaded that it had already paid out the maximum $1m to third parties with claims arising out of the accident and had discharged its contractual liabilities. The appellant was granted summary judgment, but the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago allowed the respondent's appeal. The Privy Council, in dismissing the appellant's appeal, held that s 10 of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act (Ch 48:51) contained no provision authorising the insurer to delay paying a claim established against its insured in order to enable other claimants to catch up so as to allow the rateable payment of multiple claimants on a limited insurance fund. 

Negligence – Causation. The claimant brought a claim for damages for personal injuries and consequential loss arising from the performance of a medical diagnostic procedure, an angiogram, by a hospital for which the defendant had responsibility for the medical and surgical services at the hospital. The Queen's Bench Division dismissed the claimants case on the basis that she had been adequately informed and had not withdrawn her consent. 

Employment – Dismissal. The employment tribunal dismissed the employee's claims for wrongful dismissal, automatic unfair dismissal and whistle blowing claims. On appeal by the employee against those findings, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the tribunal's decision, taking the view, among other things, that the employee had been unable to demonstrate that the tribunal had fallen into error in finding that the matters relied on by the employee did not constitute protected disclosures. 

Negligence – Damage. The claimant suffered a severe head injury as a result of a collision between his motorcycle and a tractor and trailer driven by the first defendant. He brought a claim for personal injuries and damages. On a trial of liability only, the court found that the collision had been caused by the first defendant's negligence, for which the claimant had been two-thirds contributorily negligent. 

Employment – Continuity. The service provided by the disabled employee was transferred to a new employer which involved increased hours of work. The employee's request for a reduction in the hours of work proposed was refused. She claimed that such an increase would cancel an adjustment which had been made to her in the light of her disability and would be discriminatory. The new employer took the view that the employee did not come within any of the classes of those entitled to make a claim as set out in the Equality Act 2010. The employment tribunal disagreed and decided that her claim could proceed to a determination on its merits as she came within the terms of s 39(1) of the Act as an 'applicant' On appeal by the new employer against that decision, the Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld the tribunal's decision and dismissed the appeal. 

Mental health – Court of Protection. The Official Solicitor, as G's litigation friend, appealed against a costs order made by the President of the Court of Protection. By that order, the first respondent (ANL) was to pay 30% of G's costs and 30% of the local authority's costs of and incidental to an application made by ANL to be joined as a party to the proceedings. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appeal. It held, inter alia, that it could not be said that ANL's application or the decision to refuse it had been steps taken outside of the Court of Protection Rules 2007, SI 2007/1744. Accordingly, the President had been required to consider costs in accordance with the Rules. In having done so, he had not exceeded the broad ambit of his discretion such that he had been wrong. 

European Union – Employment. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling deciding, among other things that, art 1(1)(a) of Council Directive (EC) 98/59 should be interpreted as precluding national legislation that introduced the undertaking and not the establishment as the sole reference unit, where the effect of the application of that criterion was to preclude the information and consultation procedure provided for in arts 2 to 4 of that directive, when the dismissals in question would have been considered 'collective redundancies', under the definition in art 1(1)(a) of that directive, had the establishment been used as the reference unit.