Latest Cases

Education – Local education authority. The defendant local education authority proposed to amend its policy so that pupils attending faith schools would be entitled to free public transport only if the relevant distance criteria were met and no suitable alternative school, including a non-faith school, was located within two or three miles of home. The claimants, who were affiliated with faith schools, sought judicial review. The Administrative Court, in allowing the application, held that black and minority ethnic origin children suffered a particular disadvantage as a consequence of the amended policy, which was not a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Further, the report relied on in making the decision had misstated the law. 

Arbitration – Award. In the course of patent proceedings, an arbitrator made two awards. The first concerned matters relating to jurisdiction and the scope of the arbitration. The second was a judgment on contractual interpretation. The claimant appealed. The Commercial Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the second award had been affected by a serious irregularity, and that it was appropriate to grant relief. 

Practice – Summary judgment. The claimant company permitted the defendants to make use of its name. It terminated that permission, but the defendants continued to use its name. The claimant commenced proceedings, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. It applied for summary judgment of its claim. The Chancery Division held that, on the evidence, there was no doubt that the defence had no prospect of success on any of the grounds relied upon. 

Town and country planning – Permission for development. The court previously held that an error of law had arisen because of a failure on the part of the first defendant Secretary of State (see [2015] All ER (D) 33 (May)). The second to fourth defendants contended that a declaration should be made, instead of a quashing order. The Administrative Court held that it was appropriate, in the exceptional circumstances of the case, to grant a declaration as to the unlawfulness that had occurred. 

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. A child, A, was the product of artificial insemination between R and a donor. H and R were in a civil partnership but later separated. A residence order was made in favour of H. H commenced a relationship and cohabited with M, who was a female to male transsexual. It was contended that M and A had developed a father/daughter bond. After M and H separated. M sought to resume his relationship with A and have contact with her. He applied to the court for leave to apply for a child arrangements order. The Family Court refused to give leave on the basis that although M had spent a significant period of time living with A, other factors, including the potentially damaging effect on A's welfare militated against allowing M to proceed with his substantive application. 

Company – Administration order. The Companies Court, in dismissing an application by joint administrators, held that, as a result of art 4 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No 5 and Saving Provisions) Order 2013, conditional fee arrangements were unavailable to the administrators who had been appointed under the special administration regime. 

Immigration – Detention. The claimant sought judicial review of his immigration detention for a period exceeding two years and seven months. The Administrative Court, in allowing the application, held that the defendant Secretary of State had breached the duty of candour and had acted with conspicuous unfairness in failing to disclose information concerning the claimant's family. That had been relevant to her decision to detain and had resulted in the claimant remaining in detention longer than he otherwise would have done. Further, the Secretary of State had breached the principles in R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Singh ([1984] 1 All ER 983). 

Injunction – Interlocutory. The claimants appealed against an award to the defendants of a sum in excess of £27m on an inquiry as to the damages they had suffered as a result of an interim injunction, restraining the defendants from marketing a drug pending trial. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in dismissing the appeal, considered the general principles to be applied in assessing the damages payable under a cross-undertaking given in respect of the grant of an interim injunction and held that, in all the circumstances, the judge had been entitled to have drawn the overall conclusions he had. 

Practice – Summary judgment. The claimant Middle Eastern banks (the banks) claimed that the first defendant had falsely claimed to have an irrevocable power of attorney from them and had purportedly entered into partnerships, governed by English law, under which the relevant bank was the general partner and he was the limited partner, which he had then registered with the Registrar of Companies (the Registrar). They alleged that he had then used the certificate of registration as an instrument of fraud. The Chancery Division granted the banks summary judgment, holding that the first defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending the claims. However, the court declined to order the Registrar to delete the registration of the limited partnerships, holding that notwithstanding the circumstances which had led to the registration, once the certificate of registration had been issued, that was conclusive evidence that a limited partnership had come into existence, for the purposes of s 8C(4) of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907. The principle that fraud unravelled all was not a sufficient basis to go behind the conclusive evidence provision in s 8C of the Act. 

Judgment – Default judgment. The claimant brought a claim in restitution, contending that joint venture and partnership agreements had been entered into in respect of a development project, but that, having made his contribution to the project, he had not received any financial return from it. He sought various declarations from the court. Judgment in default was entered against the first defendant, who was party to the joint venture. The Chancery Division, allowing the first defendant's appeal, held that, taking account of his new grounds of appeal and amended draft defence, the court's discretion would be exercised afresh in the first defendant's favour because there was a real prospect of successfully defending the claim.