Latest Cases

Practice – Strike out. The claimants brought proceedings to set aside a judgment granted in favour of the defendant, alleging that it had been obtained by fraud. The defendant applied to strike out and/or dismiss the claimants' claim. The Chancery Division, in allowing the application, held that on the facts, it could not be concluded that the claimants had an arguable case, nor one with any realistic prospect of success, to set aside the judgment. The claimants' proposed amended case of fundamental deception did not save the proceedings, was not arguable and, in any event, was flawed by the fresh evidence rule, in particular the reasonable diligence requirement. 

European Union – Employment. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Council Directive (EEC) 92/85 (on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) and Directive (EC) 2006/54. The request had been made in proceedings between Ms Rosselle and the Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité and another, concerning the refusal to grant her a maternity allowance on the ground that she had not completed the minimum contribution period required under national law. 

Assault – Civil action. The claimant's claim for damages for assault, in which he alleged that unreasonable and excessive force was applied in the course of his arrest, was dismissed and he appealed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, upheld the judge's decision on the basis set out in the respondents' notice. It held that, on the facts, the judge had been plainly wrong to have found, even as a 'borderline case', that it had been more likely than not that the force used had been unreasonable and excessive. In the circumstances of the case, the force used had not been unreasonable, excessive or disproportionate. 

Costs – Orders for costs. It was common ground that, overall, the defendants had been successful in previous proceedings (see[2015] All ER (D) 233 (Apr)) and that the starting point was that they were entitled to their costs. The present proceedings concerned the extent to which a deduction should be made from those costs to reflect issues on which the defendants had been unsuccessful and the amount the claimants should be ordered to pay on account of the defendants' costs. The Patents Court held that, in the circumstances, the claimants would be ordered to pay 75% of the defendants' costs. As to payment on account, a reasonable figure was 55%, that was 55% of 75% of the defendants' total bill. 

Extradition – Extradition order. The appellant appealed against orders for his extradition to Lithuania to face trial for four offences concerning the possession and supply or attempted supply of cannabis. The Divisional Court, in allowing the appeal, held that the interference with his child's family life outweighed the public interest in appellant's extradition. In particular, given the relative lack of seriousness of the offence with which the appellant was charged and the likely sentence which would be imposed in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, it would be disproportionate, within the meaning of art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, for the judge's order to stand. 

Bank – Securities. The Chancery Division considered whether the defendant issuers, wholly-owned subsidiaries of Lloyds Banking Group plc, were entitled to redeem certain enhanced capital note in advance of their respective maturity dates. That turned on whether a capital disqualification event (CDE) had occurred. The court considered the terms of relevant trust deed and made a declaration that a CDE had not occurred. 

Bankruptcy – Trustee in bankruptcy. The defendant solicitors had been in practice together until they were declared bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy of the first defendant applied for an order that time costs and expenses, which had been incurred in preserving files and records of the practice, reconciling the client accounts of the practice and incidental costs, should be deducted from the client accounts of the practice. The Chancery Division, in dismissing the application, held that the court did not have jurisdiction to make the order sought because, among other things, the first defendant, notwithstanding being made bankrupt, had been under an unbroken and continuing duty to manage the client accounts and client monies in accordance with the Solicitors Accounts Rules and that obligation could not be, and was not, displaced by his bankruptcy and could be, and was, displaced only when the Solicitors Regulation Authority decided to intervene in the practice. 

Environment – Protection. The defendant company pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to regs 38(1)(a) and 39(1) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, following the discharge of untreated sewage from its pumping station. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in upholding the fine of £250,000 imposed by a recorder, held, among other things, that the court would have had no hesitation in upholding a very substantially higher fine. The court gave guidance on the approach to be adopted under the Sentencing Council's definitive guideline on environmental offences in respect of very large commercial organisations. 

Animal – Protection. The appellant appealed by way of case stated against his conviction for a number of counts of contraventions of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the prosecution had not failed to comply with the time limits laid down by s 31(1) of the Act. In particular, a certificate under s 31(2) of the Act could be issued after a challenge had been raised in court proceedings, but the certificate was not essential and it was the individual with responsibility for deciding whether a prosecution should go forward whose thoughts and beliefs were relevant. 

Police – Unlawful conduct. The claimants issued proceedings against the defendant Metropolitan Police Commissioner for assault, trespass and false imprisonment. The jury found facts favourable to the Commissioner, but the claimants sought to proceed further on the basis that the Commissioner's liability could be established on a joint tortfeasor basis. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the application, held that the use of force by the individual officers for whose actions the Commissioner was statutorily responsible had been, on the jury's verdict, reasonable in the circumstances and the defence under s 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 succeeded, entitling the Commissioner to judgment.