Latest Cases

Practice – Summary judgment. Summary judgment was entered for the first defendant, pursuant to CPR 24.2, in respect of the whole of the claimants' claim against the first defendant under s 140A-C of the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the claimants' appeal and upholding the order, held, inter alia, that it could not be that the burden of proof imposed by s 140B(9) of the Act had been intended to mean that, in a case where an unfair relationship was alleged, no summary disposal should ever take place. In the circumstances, it had been fully open to the judge to have found that the test in CPR 24.2 had been satisfied and to have given summary judgment. 

Costs – Orders for costs. It was common ground that, overall, the defendants had been successful in previous proceedings (see[2015] All ER (D) 233 (Apr)) and that the starting point was that they were entitled to their costs. The present proceedings concerned the extent to which a deduction should be made from those costs to reflect issues on which the defendants had been unsuccessful and the amount the claimants should be ordered to pay on account of the defendants' costs. The Patents Court held that, in the circumstances, the claimants would be ordered to pay 75% of the defendants' costs. As to payment on account, a reasonable figure was 55%, that was 55% of 75% of the defendants' total bill. 

Deed – Rectification. The claimants sought to vary the provisions of a deed of variation, so as to take advantage of changes in the law and make it effective for inheritance tax and capital gains tax purposes. The Chancery Division held that the claim would be allowed, although any reference to the provisions of s 62, and its relevant subsections, of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 would be removed. 

Town and country planning – Enforcement notice. The Planning Court held that an appeal against an enforcement notice made under s 174(2)(f) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (ground f), on the basis that any step specified in an enforcement notice exceeded what was necessary to remedy an injury to amenity caused by the relevant breach of planning control, could not be entertained when: (i) there was no appeal under s 174(2)(a) of the Act that planning permission should be granted; and (ii) the planning objections which the step addressed were not limited to any injury to amenity. Therefore, whether an appeal lay on that basis under ground f depended upon the nature of the planning objection that the step sought to remedy. 

European Union – Employment. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of Council Directive (EEC) 92/85 (on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) and Directive (EC) 2006/54. The request had been made in proceedings between Ms Rosselle and the Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité and another, concerning the refusal to grant her a maternity allowance on the ground that she had not completed the minimum contribution period required under national law. 

European Union – Trade marks. The General Court of the European Union dismissed the action brought by Yoo Holdings Ltd against the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) concerning opposition proceedings between Eckes-Granini Group GmbH and Yoo Holdings Ltd, regarding the application by the latter company for registration of the word sign 'YOO' as a Community trade mark. 

Costs – Order for costs. In previous proceedings, the claimant, Network Rail, had obtained judgment on all issues of principle, save for one minor issue. Network Rail sought indemnity costs and interest on the damages awarded. The Technology and Construction Court ruled that the defendants would pay their own and the claimant's costs of the proceedings on a standard basis. The costs reserved from the first case management conference would be costs in the case and would be borne by the defendants, given the final costs order. Interest would run from the dates when the expenditure and losses had been incurred until judgment, with no gap, at the agreed interest rates. 

Environment – Protection. The defendant company pleaded guilty to an offence contrary to regs 38(1)(a) and 39(1) of the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2010, following the discharge of untreated sewage from its pumping station. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in upholding the fine of £250,000 imposed by a recorder, held, among other things, that the court would have had no hesitation in upholding a very substantially higher fine. The court gave guidance on the approach to be adopted under the Sentencing Council's definitive guideline on environmental offences in respect of very large commercial organisations. 

Animal – Protection. The appellant appealed by way of case stated against his conviction for a number of counts of contraventions of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the prosecution had not failed to comply with the time limits laid down by s 31(1) of the Act. In particular, a certificate under s 31(2) of the Act could be issued after a challenge had been raised in court proceedings, but the certificate was not essential and it was the individual with responsibility for deciding whether a prosecution should go forward whose thoughts and beliefs were relevant. 

Police – Unlawful conduct. The claimants issued proceedings against the defendant Metropolitan Police Commissioner for assault, trespass and false imprisonment. The jury found facts favourable to the Commissioner, but the claimants sought to proceed further on the basis that the Commissioner's liability could be established on a joint tortfeasor basis. The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the application, held that the use of force by the individual officers for whose actions the Commissioner was statutorily responsible had been, on the jury's verdict, reasonable in the circumstances and the defence under s 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 succeeded, entitling the Commissioner to judgment.