Latest Cases

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. A child had been made the subject of non-molestation injunctions, which extended to her mother, while she was a ward of court. As she approached her eighteenth birthday, the mother applied to court for an extension of the injunction to extend indefinitely beyond the conclusion of the wardship proceedings. The Family Division, in allowing the application, held that it had jurisdiction to make such an order, although the mother and child lived in Australia, as did the person the order was directed towards. Such an order could be extended beyond the conclusion of the wardship and the court had inherent jurisdiction to make such an order, either under its wardship jurisdiction or under its inherent jurisdiction to protect vulnerable adults. 

Family proceedings – Costs. Following the divorce and financial remedies hearing between the husband, wife and the second respondent L, the wife's half sister, the matter came before the court to determine costs. The Family Division held that taking all relevant factors into account, W and L should pay 25% of H's costs, on a standard basis, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. 

Adoption – Application. The judge had had to decide whether to place two young children with their paternal aunt in Belgium or to allow them to remain with their long term foster carer who had applied to adopt them. The judge had ordered that the children be sent to their aunt. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the foster carer's appeal. The judge had erred in eliding the two welfare check-lists in the Children Act 1989 and the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and failed to give any regard to the effect on the children of removing them from the care of their primary attachment figure, when it was common ground that that was a strong and entirely positive relationship, and, likewise, failed to attribute any value, from the children's perspective, to the continuation of that relationship. 

Pleading – Striking out. In the course of proceedings, the master ruled that elements of the claimant's claim would be dismissed. The claimant sought to re-amend its proceedings, and to introduce new documentary evidence. The Chancery Division held that, while the claimant's submissions concerning issue estoppel were correct, there should be finality. The application was an abuse of process, and would be dismissed. 

Limitation of Action – Land. The claimant was the freehold owner of a farm. In 1991, the defendant authority acquired a compulsory purchase order regarding some of his land. The claimant contended that he had not been properly compensated. He sought an order that the authority should refer the matter to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal (the Tribunal) for assessment and an injunction restraining the authority from using the land as a road. The Chancery Division considered two preliminary issues. It held that s 9 of the Limitation Act 1980 applied to the present application, but that it would be unconscionable for the authority to take a limitation defence. 

Family proceedings – Orders in family proceedings. B was a pertinacious litigant. He was also the moving spirit behind two limited liability companies that provided legal advice and legal services. B was also a McKenzie friend. B applied to the court to set aside two orders made against him, one being a civil restraint order and the other prohibiting him from issuing, acting in or conducting any claim or any application or any appeal in any proceedings in any court; and from acting or holding himself out to act as a McKenzie friend in the present or any other proceedings in any court. The Family Division held that the first order would be set aside and the second order would be extended indefinitely. 

Immigration – Refugee. The claimant Chechens issued judicial review proceedings, resisting their return to Sweden, under Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003, on the ground that there was a real risk that they would be refouled to Russia. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the application, held that para 3(2) of Sch 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc.) Act 2004, providing an irrebuttable legal presumption that Sweden would not refoul returned asylum seekers in breach of its international obligations did not apply to any claim founded in EU law. Further, the Secretary of State had correctly concluded that the Swedish authorities would not fail to abide by their legal obligations. 

Extradition – Extradition order. The appellant appealed against orders for his extradition to Poland to serve a sentence of three years' imprisonment. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that the first offence had contained sufficient particulars to satisfy the requirements of dual criminality, as it showed the offence of handling stolen goods. Further, the judge had come to the right conclusion as to art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, namely, that extradition would be a proportionate interference with his art 8 rights. 

Minor – Custody. D had been born to the mother in Germany. D's father was a British citizen who lived with his wife in England. D subsequently travelled to England, where he had lived ever since. The mother sought either a return order or a transfer request for proceedings to be resolved in Germany. The Family Division held that, on the evidence, the arrangement between the parties had been for D to be brought up in England by his father and his wife. D had not been, as his mother suggested, habitually resident in Germany and, therefore, art 3 of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 1980 was not engaged. 

Immigration – Education. The defendant Secretary of State found that a proxy test-taker had taken the claimant Bangladeshi national's English language tests and issued a notice of removal. The claimant sought judicial review. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), in dismissing the application, held that no improper purpose had been established. Further, an out of country appeal to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) was a demonstrably superior mechanism for the present species of challenge and that fact rendered the claimant's further procedural unfairness ground of challenge moot, as that tribunal could consider that complaint.