Latest Cases

Value added tax – Exemptions. The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) (the tribunal) dismissed the appeal by United Grand Lodge of England (UGLE) against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (the FTT) that UGLE did not qualify for exemption from VAT pursuant to art 132 of Council Directive (EC) 2006/112 as its aims were not of a philosophical, philanthropic or civic nature. The tribunal upheld the FTT's decision, deciding that the FTT had not erred in law in the way it had dealt with the issues before it. 

Sentencing – Rape – Oral penile penetration. High Court of Justiciary: Allowing an appeal against sentence by the Crown in the case of a respondent who was found guilty of orally raping a 14-year-old complainer, the daughter of his partner, and was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, the court held that the sentence was unduly lenient, as falling out with the range reasonably open to the trial judge, and it substituted a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment. 

Immigration – Deportation. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the Secretary of State's appeal against early revocation of a deportation order that had been made against the respondent foreign national. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) had been aware of, and had taken into account, all of the relevant aspects of the public interest in the deportation of foreign offenders and, on the evidence that had been before it, had reached a conclusion that had been open to it, namely that there were 'exceptional' circumstances. 

Immigration – Deportation. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the Secretary of State's appeal, holding that the deportation order made in respect of the respondent, under s 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007, had to stand. Neither the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) nor the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) had given to the public interest in the deportation of the respondent 'the great weight' that had been required. 

Judgment – Variation or revocation. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, gave a supplemental judgment to correct an error in its previous judgment, which stated that interest should be payable after judgment at the rate prescribed by the County Courts (Interest on Judgment Debts) Order 1991, SI 1991/1184 (see [2015] All ER (D) 79 (Aug)). Since no order had been perfected, it was not too late to correct the error, as it was common ground that post-judgment interest was not payable because the requisite notices had not been given. 

Immigration – Asylum seeker. The Administrative Court dismissed the claimant's judicial review proceedings on the basis that they had become academic. He had obtained self-contained accommodation, and issues such as contact with his son and his application for asylum, were not matters with which the court was seized. 

Patent – Infringement. The Patents Court held that three forms of bra infringed the claimant company's patent, and that the sale of such bras by the defendant clothing company had infringed a settlement agreement between the parties. 

Immigration – Appeal. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held, among other things, that, given the terms of ss 13(1), 13(8)(c) and 11(4)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, a 'decision' of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (the UT) to grant permission to appeal constituted an 'excluded decision'. Once an 'excluded decision' had been made by the UT, then the UT had no power to 'review' it, by virtue of the terms of s 10(1) of the Act. 

Costs – Order for costs. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed an appeal against an order for possession of a hotel and for payment of the claimant's costs of the proceedings. In the circumstances, the judge had not been justified in making those orders on the basis of the evidence that had been before him. 

Sentence – Appeal. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, dismissed an appeal against sentence, brought pursuant to s 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998. The sentences had not been unduly lenient, and the judge had been entitled to have proceeded with the sentencing procedure from a starting point of 10 years, rather than to have commenced from the 12-year starting point as prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines Council's Definitive Guidelines.