Latest Cases

Bankruptcy – Petition. The Bankruptcy High Court considered the meaning of 'ordinarily resident' and ruled that it had jurisdiction to make a bankruptcy order against the respondent debtor, a member of the Pakistan Senate, notwithstanding that it accepted his evidence that he usually resided in Pakistan. The time he spent in the United Kingdom, where his children were schooled, where he owned properties and had business interests, evidenced a degree of permanence. It followed that he had a place of residence in England and Wales in the period mentioned in s 265 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 

Sentence – Suspended sentence. In the circumstances, the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division held that total sentences of 6 months' imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, for religiously aggravated intentional harassment and assault by beating, had not been unduly lenient. The recorder had exercised his discretion to suspend the sentences in a way that he was entitled to have done. 

Divorce – Financial provision. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the appellant husband's appeal in respect of one element of an order, which provided for an automatic increase in the level of periodical payments payable to the respondent wife following the date upon which the youngest child ceased privately funded secondary education. The judge had been wrong as a matter of law, and plainly wrong in the exercise of his discretion, by having made an advance variation order based upon only one known element with respect to the parties' finances, and the needs of the youngest child, some four years hence. 

Costs – Order for costs. The Technology and Construction Court, on the claimant's application for indemnity costs following the defendant's failure to accept a claimant's CPR Pt 36 offer, held that the offer had been a valid offer within the meaning of CPR Pt 36 and a genuine attempt to settle the claim. In the circumstances, there was no reason why the claimant should not be entitled to indemnity costs from the earliest date by which the defendant could reasonably have put itself in a position to make an informed assessment of the strength of the claim on liability, which was four months from the date of the offer. 

European Union – Commercial policy. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling concerning the validity and interpretation of: (i) Council Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006; (ii) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2009, following an expiry review pursuant to art 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96; and (iii) art 236 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92. The requests had been made in two sets of proceedings, brought by C & J Clark International Ltd (Clarks) against the United Kingdom Revenue and Customs Commissioners and by Puma SE (Puma) against the Principal Customs Office, Nuremberg, relating to the anti-dumping duty paid by Clarks and Puma, pursuant to the regulations in dispute, when importing footwear with uppers of leather into the European Union. 

Insurance – Liability insurance. The Commercial Court granted declarations in favour of the claimant insured, ruling, among other things, that a claim for indemnity insurance had been first made within the relevant policy period. If it had not, but, rather, had been made by letter dated 2 April 2013, it was covered by the second excess policy by virtue of an extension clause and the defendant insurers were not entitled to decline cover by virtue of a clause in the primary policy. 

Guarantee – Bank guarantee. The Technology and Construction Court considered the claimant oil company's application for summary judgment against the defendant bank (Barclays) on a claim for payment under the guarantee. The guarantee had been issued as security for a company's performance of its obligations to the claimant under a contract for work on an oil field. The court ruled that it was not a pre-requisite to the validity of the claimant's demand that the claimant had to make a statement that no amendment had been made to the contract impacting the timely performance of the works under the contract. Such a declaration was irrelevant to Barclays' obligation under the guarantee. 

Prison – Discipline. The Divisional Court dismissed the claimant serving young offender's challenge to the defendant Independent Adjudicator's ruling that the defence of duress was not available to his disciplinary proceedings for the unauthorised possession of alcohol. The principles underlying the general distinction between criminal and disciplinary offences told strongly in favour of treating the Young Offender Institution Rules 2000, SI 2000/3371, and the Prison Rules 1999, SI 1999/278, as separate non-criminal disciplinary codes for the purpose of the application of the common law defence of duress. 

Licensing – Premises. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, set aside the district judge's decision that he had had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the revocation of the appellant's premises licence because no person entitled to appeal had done so within the statutory time limit. His conclusion that the mere fact that there had been two corporate entities involved had meant that there had been a mistake of identity which could not be corrected pursuant to the powers in s 123 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 had been an error. 

Building contract – Construction. The Technology and Construction Court made three preliminary rulings concerning limitation in a case involving defects in the construction of residential properties. It ruled on the time when the cause of action had accrued and held that, on the true construction of clause 2.5.5 of the relevant building contract, there was one single cause of action. The clause did not operate to preclude claims for defects, whether in contract or in tort, from being brought against the defendant after expiry of the relevant warranty period.