One year of war in Ukraine has seen the country demonstrate not only its military capacity and resilience, but also its commitment to the rule of law.

As soon as the war began and the nature of the destruction which Russia inflicted on the people of Ukraine became apparent so did discussion of the prosecution of perpetrators of war crimes.  

The Prosecutor General of Ukraine began the investigation of war crimes and there has been at least one prosecution of a low-ranking soldier for war crimes. At the international level the International Criminal Court has sent a team to Ukraine and has indicated it is prepared to prosecute war crimes arising out of the conflict. In addition, there has been discussion of establishing a special tribunal to prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression. International assistance has been given to Ukrainian investigators and prosecutors.

However, the reality is that the prosecution on a large scale of the perpetrators of war crimes is unlikely to take place until after the end of the war and upon a significant change in political circumstances.

The fact that Vladimir Putin and senior Russian military officials are in Russia and are likely to remain there is an obstacle to their prosecution. However, that is not to say that Putin and his military leaders will not be prosecuted. It is not impossible that, in the future, circumstances will lead to their prosecution.

This time should be used to devise a strategy as how war crimes committed in Ukraine are investigated and prosecuted effectively and efficiently. There are some useful lessons to be learnt from the investigation and prosecution of war crimes committed during the 1992-95 war in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) attracted much attention for its prosecution of high-profile figures such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. But less well known and recognised has been the role of the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the prosecution of war crimes.  

The ICTY transferred some of its cases to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the ‘Court BiH’). Since the ICTY completed its case load, the Court BiH has had sole jurisdiction over the prosecution of war crimes. However, it has transferred some of the less complex cases to local courts across the two entities of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Nearly 30 years after the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many war crimes cases have yet to be prosecuted. No one should expect an early end to the investigation and prosecution of war crimes arising out of the Ukrainian conflict.

The lessons to be learnt are as follows:

  • There need to be clear criteria for determining where crimes are tried; which crimes are to be tried at the ICC and which crimes are to be tried in the Ukrainian courts and at which level.
  • The offences charged should reflect the extent of the crime. For example, where appropriate genocide and crimes against humanity should be charged rather than the lesser offence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. Prosecutors may need the assistance of military analysts to develop a case theory.
  • Independent and highly competent judges and prosecutors who are prepared to take difficult and unpopular decisions are essential. For example, prosecutors must be prepared to investigate and prosecute war crimes committed by their own side. They must also be prepared only to prosecute where there is the evidence to do so. Equally important are skilled defence lawyers who are conversant with the law relating to war crimes.
  • Huge resources – financial, technical and material – are required. These are likely to be delivered only with the support of the international community.

Pictured above: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky with Speaker of the House of Commons, Sir Lindsay Hoyle and Speaker of the House of Lords, Lord McFall during Zelensky's visit to London on 9 February 2023.